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Bioterrorism, the use of biological and chemical agents for terrorist purposes, is one of 
the most potentially signifi cant health and security threats currently facing the United 
States.  Healthcare facilities as isolated entities are alone unable to provide suffi cient, 
adaptable emergency response options during a bioterrorist attack—an unpredictable, 
low probability, high consequence event.  Bioterrorism response must be systemic, 
distributed, fl exible, and responsive for a wide range of event incidents, scenarios and 
contexts.  A signifi cant problem yet to be adequately addressed is the mitigation of the 
walking well—those who are not sick or injured but have the potential to inundate any 
designated response setting.
Architectural interventions alone are limited in their ability to provide an appropriate 
response to an act of bioterrorism.  An analogy to the human immune system and how 
it operates in the body to overcome pathogens will be used to articulate a systematic 
bioterrorism response and a series of architectural interventions for dealing with the 
walking well.  Similar to our immune system, a response network (or system) should 
be created that operates throughout high risk urban contexts and takes advantage of 
existing architectural settings in order to deploy as needed and where needed in response 
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to a bioterrorist attack.  An antibody response to bioterrorism must be able to adapt to 
meeting the needs of various scenarios and contexts in which an incident might occur. 
Drawing on this biological metaphor, any proposed architectural interventions must 
include latent capabilities while having the ability to be activated in place and scalable 
in order to accommodate the multiple potential threats and the many variables inherent 
with bioterrorism.
The proposal for an architectural response to bioterrorism is situated in Washington, 
D.C., identifi ed as the highest potential target city in the United States for acts of 
bioterrorism.  Appropriate latent resources capable of acting as a part of the response 
network throughout the D.C. urban context will be identifi ed and their potential activation 
will be explored through two example scenarios, which will be used to illustrate the 
proposed model for systematic response.  The most architecturally signifi cant locations 
for (activated) small scale interjections will be designed to meet the fi rst response needs 
of the general population who would be moving about in the city during the detection 
of an event. These sites and features will allow for differing degrees of self-diagnosis 
during and following an event as well as provide general day to day and event related 
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public health information.  The proposed architectural interjections will be designed 
to respond to the predicted fear and panic exhibited by the walking well during a 
bioterrorist attack, and minimize their potential for overwhelming hospitals and other 
healthcare settings in the target region.
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INTRODUCTION
Bioterrorism, the use of biological and chemical agents for terrorist purposes, is one of 
the most potentially signifi cant health and security threats currently facing the United 
States.  Bioterrorism is an unpredictable, low probability, high consequence event.  Any 
response, including architectural settings for diagnosis and treatment must be systemic, 
dispersed, adaptable, and reactive to a wide range of event variables. This thesis focuses 
on a systematic response and specifi c architectural interventions for a signifi cant yet 
substantially unaddressed population that would present themselves in great numbers 
upon available response settings and services—the walking well, those who are not 
sick or injured, but result as a manifestation of panic.  This population has the potential 
to cripple existing healthcare response services that would otherwise adequately handle 
most scenarios.
The original intent of this thesis was to establish an architectural model that provides a 
kit of parts with adaptable, modular and mobile capabilities designed to accommodate 
a range of episodic incidents, scenarios and contexts.  However, architectural 
interventions alone are limited in their ability to provide an appropriate response to 
an act of bioterrorism.  The low probability, high consequence nature of an event of 
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bioterrorism requires that an architectural and systemic response should provide both 
latent and activated programmatic functions.  A response to bioterrorism must be able 
to provide a response throughout an urban or regional threat context that is fl exible and 
responsive for a range of event variables.
Throughout this thesis several terms will be used to defi ne the nature of a bioterrorist 
event—incident, scenario and context.  Incident refers to the type of agent, either 
chemical or biological, dispersed throughout an urban threat context.  Scenario defi nes 
the way in which an incident occurs—within a building or an exterior context, and the 
number of people that might be impacted.  Context establishes the range of location(s) 
in which the response will take place.  These terms will frame the conditions used to 
defi ne probable scenarios of bioterrorist attack.
The Threat of Terrorism:  On September 11, 2001, the reality of a terrorist attack was 
made known to Americans. Since then, high risk environments have been defi ned, 
putting Washington, D.C. at the highest risk for attack.  This thesis will focus on a 
response proposal based in Washington, D.C.  Despite the awareness of vulnerabilities 
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within the United States post-September 11, signifi cant gaps still lie between 
emergency responders and healthcare facilities, therefore presenting the challenge of 
providing a suffi cient response for higher probability locations, and especially acts of 
bioterrorism.
The nature of bioterrorism is that in any given location there is a relative low probability 
of an event occurring, yet there is a high consequence of not being prepared.  The 
unpredictable nature of bioterrorism in terms of timing, location and scope remains 
the greatest challenge to healthcare facilities and emergency responders.  This 
unpredictability hinders the ability of healthcare facility planning and preparedness. 
As a result, two models of an architectural response can occur—highly specialized 
centralized locations, and decentralized models of response throughout densely 
populated urban contexts.
Despite the unpredictable nature of bioterrorism, models of response are being developed 
with highly specialized and centralized response facilities.  During an event, centralized 
settings are specifi cally designed to respond to terrorist events and other disasters but 
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have the potential to be remote and inconveniently located from the event epicenter 
and unable to provide an adequate response alone.  During an event all patient fl ow 
will be directed to these central locations—establishing a great potential for quickly 
reaching capacity.  An example of a centralized model is ER One, currently being 
implemented in Washington, D.C.  ER One is an excellent response site if an event 
occurs in a location and way that can benefi t from its resources.  However, specialized 
models such as ER One are expensive and unfeasible to replicate in suffi cient numbers 
and locations to adequately respond to the range of potential locations and populations 
that may become targets of bioterrorism.  Although the concepts and intentions of the 
ER One project have been designed to respond to a great number of variables generated 
during a bioterrorist event, this type of setting is economically diffi cult to replicate at 
more than one location within an urban threat context.
As a supplement to centralized response settings, decentralized emergency response 
options throughout an urban context have a greater potential to serve as fi rst response 
settings given the unpredictable locations of a bioterrorist attack and the real and perceived 
health needs of the general population, impacted by the event.  A decentralized model of 
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response must be low cost, widely dispersed, accessible to all types of victims, versatile 
and activated similar to the deployment of oxygen masks on an airplane.  A response 
capability is always present in a latent form.  Once an event occurs a dispersed response 
can be activated providing more immediate care to a larger number of people within 
a response context.  A dispersed response capability located frequently throughout a 
context therefore must be relatively inexpensive to implement, and must be able to 
serve a wide range of potentially impacted populations.
An act of bioterrorism would potentially place a great burden on emergency response, 
including healthcare facilities and other medical settings such as clinics, to respond 
effectively and effi ciently throughout the timeline of an event.  The most considerable 
issue to be addressed in bioterrorism is the capacity of a medical response to handle the 
unpredictability of patient fl ow: how many people will be impacted, where they will 
present for care, and the rate at which they will arrive and need care.
Where patients will go during and following a bioterrorist attack is unpredictable in 
regards to the number of victims generated, and where they will seek care.  Both critical 
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and non-critical victims will be produced by an event along with the greatest number 
of people who will present at an identifi ed response site—the walking well.  Literature 
reviews, fi rst hand research and interviews with experts from the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), ER One, and other healthcare 
facilities in the midst of preparing for bioterrorism, was conducted as a part of this 
thesis investigation.  This research established the limits of existing strategies, identifi ed 
gaps in response capabilities and established that architectural interjections alone 
located within healthcare facilities would not address the most signifi cant problem--the 
walking well.  Most healthcare facilities are generally capable of handling the demands 
of critical victims during a bioterrorist attack.  Even the most advanced healthcare 
facilities are simply not able to deal with the potential total number of victims who 
may present themselves at any given location when the non-critical and walking well 
are included.
In order to allow the healthcare system and emergency responders to function, the 
walking well must be identifi ed and their needs addressed away from healthcare 
facilities so that these settings can actually focus on treating victims with clinical 
7
treatment needs.  Planning and response efforts should take into account the walking 
well.  Any response plan should aim to alleviate fear and panic by quickly providing 
the general public with opportunities to determine their risk of exposure through 
information and self diagnosis.  A response dispersed throughout high risk contexts 
must present multiple opportunities for people to determine the status of their health. 
Providing the public with opportunities to gain a sense of control through information, 
their interaction with an informative architectural response site or intervention of some 
sort during an unfamiliar event can help ease the inevitable element of fear and panic.
Probable Factors: Potential bioterrorist attacks include a range of probable incidents. 
Typologies of incidents include the release of biological agents, the dispersal of 
chemical agents (typically in the form of a bomb) or the dispersion of radiation through 
a radiological device. This thesis will focus on two example incidents—one chemical 
and one biological.  These two typologies are the most predicted and most obtainable 
by terrorists.  Each agent, chemical or biological, requires an inherently differing means 
of response.   
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Due to their ability to produce a more evident and instant impact, chemical agents are 
weapons of immediacy.  Immediately upon the release of a chemical agent, patients 
will show obvious signs of exposure and will be in immediate need of treatment within 
close proximity to the epicenter.  An architectural response to a chemical attack must be 
able to react to the immediate needs in a relatively concentrated area around the event 
site.
Biological agents incubate within their victims often long before their presence is 
known, making them weapons of delayed impact.  Due to the transient nature of our 
culture, many people work and commute within a metro area often utilizing highly 
populated mass transit systems.  A response to a biological event will unfold over a 
longer period of time in a much more dispersed area because of this cultural pattern, 
but may involve equal or greater number of patients than a chemical attack.  An 
architectural and systemic response must take into account multiple variables presented 
within chemical and biological events. Bioterrorism is unpredictable; the agent that 
will be used can not be predicted.  Preparing for a bioterrorist attack demands the need 
for a ready response for all types of incidents.
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Bioterrorism can be executed through many probable scenarios during an attack. 
During an event, it is impossible to accurately predict all potential sites for the release 
of chemical or biological agents, and it can be assumed that no building or location 
is immune against the threat of an attack.  Any architectural or systemic response 
to bioterrorism must take into account this unpredictability and therefore be widely 
dispersed throughout high risk contexts.
Existing high risk event contexts are simply not capable of suffi ciently responding 
to the potential range of conditions associated with a bioterrorist event.  Healthcare 
facilities as isolated response centers are not prepared to handle the delivery of care 
to all potential patients that might present at any one emergency department during a 
bioterrorist attack.  At the same time, existing emergency responders are not prepared to 
handle all the variables related to a bioterrorist attack. In order for a suffi cient response 
to occur, healthcare facilities and emergency responders need to be systematically 
integrated and coordinated in their efforts.
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Metaphorical Reference:  Throughout this thesis, a metaphorical reference to biology 
will be used to conceptualize an architectural and systemic response network with 
latent and activated elements.  An architectural and systemic response based on the 
principles of our immune system form the basis for the design of the proposed response 
concepts. The antibody system is comprised of several types of components, always 
present within our system, monitoring the condition of pathogenic entrance and attack. 
During a response to a pathogen, the human immune system responds in a systemic, 
dispersed manner in order to prevent pathogens from further infecting the body.  A 
systemic architectural response must be created that establishes a network of existing 
locations throughout an urban context, programmed to respond based on a wide variety 
of potential needs and the demands of the many possible locations,  events, and types 
and number of patients generated.  A response network must be integrated and include 
both healthcare facilities (where critical patients can be treated) and alternative care 
locations (where emergent and non-critical patients can be served.)  This network must 
allow the dispersion of a response within an activated network—transit nodes and 
iconographic locations dispersed throughout a threat region that people are familiar 
with and capable of locating and accessing during a response.  
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Architectural Intervention Criteria: Interventions must be designed to address 
the characteristics of low probability, high consequence, and unpredictable terrorism 
related events.  Response sites and features should compliment existing resources 
including healthcare facilities and should be widely dispersed throughout high risk, 
highly populated areas.  In order to be widely dispersed and located effectively across 
large regions they should be low cost and have latent capabilities that allow them to be 
of some use under non-threat conditions.  These interventions should response to the 
following design criteria:
Integrated Technology: Integrated information technology should be included to provide 
the capability of notifying the public and providing continuous information during a 
response to a bioterrorist event.  This type of systemic response should allow mobilized 
teams, comprised of medical staff, fi rst responders and emergency response offi cials, 
the ability to communicate and monitor activated interventions throughout and urban 
context.  Architectural interventions that incorporate integrated technology would be 
capable of being activated (through a remote hierarchical network control center ) after 
an event has occurred and a response is necessary.  Latently, integrated technology 
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would enable architectural interventions the ability to display pertinent public health 
information (controlled by integrated technology.)
Didactic Awareness: Response sites and interventions should possess an iconographic 
awareness similar to established means of emergency response (i.e. fi re alarms distributed 
throughout a building) so that public knows a threat is eminent or underway and that 
they need to take appropriate action.  Didactic architecture is an informative model of 
architecture and an integrated part of the everyday which establishes an awareness of 
response.  During an event it is diffi cult to predict how the public will react, however it 
is understood that the public will respond in a more effective manner if there is a sense 
of familiarity with the location and use cues of the response feature.
Dynamic Response: A dynamic architectural intervention must be responsive to spatial 
and strategic challenges presented during a bioterrorist attack.  The unpredictability 
of event location and patient fl ow demand that architectural and systemic features be 
capable of responding in an effective and timely manner.  Dispersing programmed 
interventions systematically throughout a threat context establishes the ability to respond 
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appropriately to the unpredictable nature of an event.  A response to bioterrorism should 
be capable of being activated based on the dynamic fl ow of patients over the life of an 
event.
Response Program: A programmatic response will include the following elements: 
Network control center , Public Health Information, Self Triage, and Wayfi nding. 
Architectural response program components must take into consideration that existing 
healthcare networks can account for the care of critical patients—therefore the proposed 
programmatic components do not need to include functions that are already in place 
within a healthcare facility or emergency response system. For example, National 
Metropolitan Response Team (NMRT), a highly specialized response team located 
within the Washington D.C. area is already established to address decontamination 
during a bioterrorist event.  The programmatic response of this thesis will deal 
immediately with the walking well and potentially infected patients at a dispersed level 
throughout an urban context.
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Network Control Center : The network control center  is the integration of existing 
response systems and proposed architectural interventions to bioterrorism; ultimately 
it is a non-architectural connection between designed interventions and emergency 
responders that provides continuity during the timeline of a bioterrorist event.  During 
a response effort it is imperative that fi rst responders communicate internally so that 
efforts aren’t duplicated and care is distributed based on patient fl ow. The proposed 
network control center  would exceed the current ability of emergency responders—for 
example 911 (emergency) dispatch, by integrating more typologies of response (public 
health, law enforcement, etc) that would have the ability to activate dispersed response 
interventions throughout a threat context. A network control center  would allow 
primary responders to monitor post event factors such as the dispersion of an agent as 
well as growth and presentation of victims impacted by an event.  The implementation 
of a network control center  (through the use of integrated technology) is an integral 
part of responding to bioterrorism that would ultimately facilitate the unifi cation of 
responders in a centralized location outside of the threat context, with the ability to 
activate dispersed, decentralized responses throughout the timeline of an event.
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Public Health Information: Public health information would be conveyed through an 
architectural intervention integrated into the fabric of an urban context that provides the 
largest number of predicted patients, the walking well, with pertinent healthcare/event 
related information.  During the response to an event, information should be conveyed 
to the public from one reliable source—the proposed network control center .  Current 
sources, such as the media often provide confl icting, dramatized reactions to current 
events.  The network control center  would determine information that would need to 
be shared with the public through architectural interventions.  Latently, information 
displays located at transit stops, nodes and along routes of travel would provide event 
related public health information and be capable of providing information on a daily 
basis relative to current health trends.
Self-Triage: The walking well should be mitigated from care locations by providing 
opportunities for self triage throughout the urban context.  Self triage would alleviate 
emergency responders from having to directly care for the walking well therefore 
allowing them to focus on critical patients.  This form of response doesn’t currently 
exist, with the exception of a telephone triage; the proposed system would be more 
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dispersed and obtainable by a broader patient population during an event than the 
current telephone triage would allow.  A self-triage system would provide potential 
patients with a series of questions assessing health conditions and determining their 
health status and where they should seek care (if needed.)
Wayfi nding: Wayfi nding is the element of the programmatic response to bioterrorism 
that provides patients, once they have received their diagnosis through the self triage 
system, the ability to navigate throughout a context (which may seem unfamiliar) to 
appropriate places to receive care.  Wayfi nding would not only provide victims with 
literal directions, but would also allow responders and health offi cials to dictate the 
fl ow of victims throughout a context by guiding them through areas which are safe from 
the epicenter and more importantly distributing patients to alternative care locations. 
Wayfi nding establishes the ability to dictate the fl ow of victims to specifi c alternative 
healthcare facilities; once a facility reaches capacity, patients would be directed to other 
locations.  Providing wayfi nding to patients through an architectural intervention (as a 
result of self-triage) would alleviate the demands placed on emergency responders to 
provide direction to the patient population during an event—particularly the walking 
well.
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Response Criteria:  An architectural and systemic response to bioterrorism must have 
some measure of its ability to respond during an attack.  Throughout this thesis, several 
federally tested exercises were studied to determine their ability to test an architectural 
and systemic response to the fullest degree.  (Inglesby, 441) All variables should be 
considered in terms of their likelihood as well as the range of variable conditions that 
they present.  Exercises exhibiting the most signifi cant variables have the potential to 
place the highest degree of stress on existing response contexts, therefore presenting 
the greatest opportunity to test a systemic architectural response.  These exercises 
established the timeline for which architectural interventions proposed in this thesis 
would come into play as well as the framework for a systemic response throughout an 
urban context.
This thesis proposal for a response to bioterrorism will be located primarily at a 
dispersed level throughout an existing mass transit system—the Metro system within 
Washington DC.  Specifi c architectural interventions will take into consideration 
existing components within the metro system to be utilized in establishing a response 
to bioterrorism.  In addition, the urban infrastructure of Washington DC will be utilized 
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to establish a dispersed, response network of alternative care location—existing 
non-healthcare facilities that can be converted to care settings during an event.  Two 
typologies of events and the timelines that follow have been chosen specifi c to the 
variables of chemical and biological incidents in order to examine the full capability 
of the proposed response.  One event will explore the immediacy of a chemical attack 
with an epicenter located at the heart of tourism—the National Mall.  This event is 
smaller in scale, and the patient population is almost immediately recognizable post 
release of the agent.  The second event investigates the timeline following the release 
of a biological agent.  This event encapsulates a broader epicenter and a larger exposed 
patient population, over a greater time period.  The two typologies of events chosen are 
different in nature, scope and scale, however both will test the capability of a proposed 
response (and architectural interventions) to a bioterrorist event.
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BIOTERRORISM:  INFECTING OUR SOCIETY
Bioterrorism Defi ned
Bioterrorism, the use of biological and chemical agents for terrorist purposes, is one 
of the most potentially signifi cant health and security realities currently facing the 
United States.  A strategic challenge of planning for a bioterrorist attack is that it is an 
unpredictable, low probability, high consequence event. “Although a terrorist attack is 
a low probability event for a single city or town, experts concur that it is not a matter 
of if or where, but when”  (Waeckerle, 254).  A bioterrorist event has the potential to 
impact a large number of people including the walking well. A response to bioterrorism 
must be dispersed throughout an urban context and responsive to a wide range of event 
variables in order to lessen the potential burden of the walking well.
Event Variables:  A bioterrorism event has many variables including a range of incidents, 
scenarios and contexts that need to be considered when designing response strategies, 
tactics, resources and architectural features.  An event is comprised of the previously 
mentioned variables; their combined impact will be unpredictable therefore leaving the 
outcome of an event indeterminable.  The overall study and scenario planning for an 
event must consider all three response variables and how they react with respect to each 
other during the timeline of a bioterrorist attack.
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Incident refers directly to the type of agent dispersed—in this thesis, chemical and 
biological events will be studied to understand the impact that their respective variables 
have on both architectural and system-wide responses.  According to studies, “the 
perceived threat of chemical or biological weapons directed against the (U.S.) civilian 
population has increased substantially” (Macintyre, 242).  Variables of each typology 
of incident takes into account the onset of an agent, the primary delivery of care and 
treatment needed, as well as the ways in which an agent may or may not be spread 
through (human) contact.
Scenario refers to the nature, scope and location of an attack including both the physical 
location and the impacted population.  Generally, a scenario can unfold either interior 
or exterior to a building or transportation system.  Also to be considered are the people 
(or victims) affected—large, small or medium concentrations or dispersions of people 
and agents.
Once an event has taken place, a response context refers to the locations where the 
incident and its resulting response occur and where the delivery of care takes place. 
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Treatment for critical victims can be established at one or more healthcare facilities 
and/or at the incident epicenter during instances in which trauma has occurred and it 
is best not to transport patients. Treatment of non-critical patients can be administered 
at alternative care locations.  Dispersed responses throughout an urban context will 
primarily assist unsuspecting victims whose symptoms have not yet presented and 
the walking well, those who may fear they have been exposed but again present no 
symptoms.
September 11, 2001:  Facing an unexpected act of terrorism, the American population 
was awakened to the reality of a man-made-disaster during the attacks in both New 
York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001 (Figure 1 & 2).  This terrorist 
attack had a fi erce impact on our Nation, and as a result   ”brought into focus the fragile 
state of the nation’s acute healthcare system” (Hanfl ing, 128).  However, “more than 
two years after the unprecedented attacks on the United States the nation’s level of 
capability for large-scale emergencies remains suboptimal” (Hanfl ing, 128).  Many 
healthcare facilities and emergency responders have begun to strategically plan response 
strategies to bioterrorism, however a great number remain unprepared.  Safeguarding Figure 2, NYC, September 11




the United States as a whole can be considered a challenge in part “because of its size 
and scope, the nations’ critical infrastructure is hard to protect; then again terrorists 
have historically not attacked it, preferring instead to go after targets offering high 
symbolic value or killing fi elds” (Jenkins, 3).
According to the September 11 Commission Report the four cities, or rather infrastructures 
at highest risk for an attack of bioterrorism include, Washington D.C., New York City, 
Los Angeles County, and Chicago.  Out of these four cities the Department of Homeland 
Security places Washington, D.C. at the highest risk.   The Commission Report also 
states that federal funding for emergency response in New York (City) and Washington, 
D.C. at the top of the current list (for funding).  This thesis will focus on a response 
located within Washington, D.C.—the highest risk location for a bioterrorist attack.  The 
proposed responses will take into account existing resources and capabilities within the 
D.C.’s urban context.
The reality of the threat of bioterrorism is something that Americans are aware of. 
According to research conducted by the Pro Research Center for the People and the 
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Press “the American people are beginning to get the message; nearly two thirds of us 
anticipate a serious terrorist attack on the United States using chemical or biological 
weapons within the next fi fty years” (Osterholm, 8). Despite the increase in public 
awareness, in part because of fi nancial limitations, emergency response and healthcare 
facilities remain unprepared for this type of threat.  Signifi cant gaps still lie between 
emergency responders and healthcare facilities due to the lack of coordination and 
preparation between these individual entities. The challenge of providing continuity 
between responders and healthcare facilities is still present and will result in an 
insuffi cient response unless all potential responders become integrated in their efforts. 
Unpredictable Availability:  September 11 established an awareness of the 
vulnerabilities of our national healthcare and security networks. In its analysis of potential 
terrorist threats, the Department of Homeland Security identifi ed a range of potential 
acts of devastation and defi ned the reality of bioterrorism as the most signifi cant health 
and security threat facing the US today.  Signifi cantly, “the conversion of commercial 
aircraft into weapons of mass destruction transformed the issue of catastrophic terrorism 
in the United States from theoretical to the gravely practical” (Hanfl ing, 140).  Types 
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of weapons (in particular biological and chemical agents) predicted to be used during a 
bioterrorist attack are readily available and obtainable by potential terrorists.  Predicted 
weapons “are a viable alternative to conventional weapons for terrorists groups and 
disgruntled individuals” therefore “this availability, coupled with terrorists’ willingness 
to use these deadly agents, has created a credible and serious threat to the nation’s 
security” (Waeckerle, 252).  The increase and growing knowledge of the availability 
of weapons of this nature by terrorist organizations has produced a more viable threat 
awareness in the U.S.  Despite the low probability of a bioterrorist attack placed upon 
the US, “the perceived threat of chemical or biological weapons (directed against the 
US civilian population) has increased substantially” (Macintyre, 242).  Post-September 
11: 
 ‘Chemical and biological weapons have not been the focus 
of domestic planning, unlike our long standing preparedness 
for a nuclear attack.  Today however, these weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) are readily available to many 
countries…’ Additionally, ‘WMDs are a viable alternative to 
conventional weapons for terrorists groups and disgruntled 
individuals.’ (Waekerle, 241)
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The availability of weapons of mass destruction has the potential to produce unpredictable 
consequences, and is a growing reality to the health and security of the United States.
Unpredictable Flow: The contingent threat of a bioterrorist event remains the greatest 
challenge to healthcare facilities and emergency responders.  The need for emergency 
response including health services provided within facilities and by fi rst responders is 
diffi cult to predict making it hard to plan for an effective response over the inherently 
extended timelines of these events - especially the release of biological agents.  Variables 
related to an act of bioterrorism are highly unforeseeable especially given the inability 
to predict the location of an event, the spread of impact and the number of victims that 
will be generated.
Healthcare facility planning and preparedness is considerably hindered by the nature 
of events predicted to occur.  The fact that “the single greatest challenge to improving 
healthcare system readiness and capacity to handle large scale disaster events has been 
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the irrefutable fact that such incidents are low probability occurrences” (Hanfl ing, 
130).  An act of bioterrorism is a low probability, high consequence event.  Low 
probability occurrences present a great challenge to healthcare facility planning and 
preparedness efforts and this is compounded by the potentially high consequences for 
lack of preparedness.  Establishing the capability of an existing healthcare network to 
be all risks ready for a low probability event is nearly impossible due lack of funding 
and necessary resources.
Strategically planning for a bioterrorism attack involves many challenges of the 
existing healthcare infrastructure, in part because of the inability to provide surge 
capacity.  Surge capacity is ‘the ability to manage a sudden, unexpected increase in 
patient volume that would otherwise severely challenge or exceed the current capacity 
of the health care system” (Hick, 2).  During a bioterrorist attack, the number of victims 
generated is unpredictable and the number of locations in which they will seek care 
is highly unknown.  Emergency responders will need to have the ability to react to a 
wide range of scenarios at potentially more than one epicenter.  Efforts to strategically 
plan a response make “it is increasingly clear that disasters may ‘occur locally’ but the 
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response generated is ‘regional’ in nature” (Hanfl ing, 129).  Any response model must 
therefore be distributed throughout a geographically broad threat context rather than be 
concentrated and centralized to single, isolated urban centers. 
Architectural Response: Despite the fact that a bioterrorist attack has many variables 
and may potentially impact large geographic regions surrounding a targeted city or 
site, physical and organizational models of response to date are focused in a manner 
that establishes care in isolated and highly specialized, centralized locations, where all 
patients are expected to present themselves and receive care.  
A specifi c example of this is ER One (Figure 3) at the Washington Hospital Center in 
Washington, D.C.  Washington Hospital Center is located within a short distance from 
the US Capital and is currently the major trauma center within DC.  ER One is described 
as an ‘all-risks ready emergency department,’ capable of responding to many variables 
of bioterrorism.  The intent of what will be a highly safeguarded superstructure is that 
during an event within the setting of Washington, D.C. care will be delivered to all 
patients within this setting no matter where an incident occurs—a highly centralized Figure 3, Proposed ER One Response3.  Washington Hospital Center
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response to a very unpredictable, potentially decentralized event.  The ineffi ciencies 
of a single healthcare facility responding to a major trauma event was illustrated in 
D.C. during Sept. 11 “of the 42 patients transported by ambulance from the scene of 
the Pentagon attack, not a single patient was delivered to the Level 1 trauma center 
(Washington Hospital Center) located 10 miles directly west of the disaster scene.  All 
ambulance transfers went to the two closest community hospitals, neither of which 
has designated trauma care capabilities” (Hanfl ing, 136).  Although the concepts and 
intentions of the ER One project meet the treatment needs of the variables presented 
during a bioterrorist event, it may in fact not meet actual response needs across the 
larger Washington DC metropolitan area since this type of setting is highly specialized 
and generally expensive to implement in suffi cient numbers within a context.
In addition to multiple centralized treatment centers, emergency response capabilities 
must be dispersed throughout the larger urban threat context.  There are two basic 
iconographic typologies of dispersed emergency response: limited resource, and 
unlimited resource.
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Limited Resource: Two examples of a limited resource emergency response would 
be fi re extinguishers (Figure 4) or fi re alarms (Figure 5).  These small devices are 
repeatedly dispersed throughout a particular context.  In the case of the fi re alarm, 
once it is activated, a commanding network control center  is notifi ed and emergency 
responders with necessary resources are dispatched to the epicenter.  Similar to these 
typologies of response, proposed architectural interventions such as self triage and 
public health information would be distributed throughout a context.  During an event 
they would be used by individuals at the event location and controlled by the network 
control center.  The proposed network control center would have the ability to notify 
and dispatch emergency responders once elements are activated.
Dispersed Resource: The second approach, in which response capabilities such as fi re 
sprinklers in buildings (Figure 6), or oxygen masks in commercial aircraft (Figure 
7) are widely available throughout the entire area.  These systems are also typically 
connected to a communication and or activation network.  Unlike a limited resource 
model, dispersed resource models typically do not rely on human activation, rather 
their response is often based on sensors monitoring an environmental condition.  Once 
Figure 4, Fire Extinguisher




sensors are activated a small scale response is deployed at a dispersed level throughout 
a particular context providing multiple responses to a number of people.  This type of 
self-activated decentralized emergency response has the ability to respond to a multiple 
locations instantaneously unlike centralized emergency responses that require the 
delayed deployment of emergency responders traveling to a centralized location.
An example of this typology is the use of oxygen mask on commercial aircraft. 
During an emergency event in which a plane may be losing pressure, a monitoring 
and control system identifi es that an emergency is occurring and oxygen masks are 
then automatically deployed.  This form of response allows a high number of potential 
victims to be served where they are seated and immediately.  In this case a dispersed 
response, distributed throughout a context is more effective on a per person basis for a 
range of event scenarios than a single centralized response capability.
Figure 6, Fire Sprinkler





The most signifi cant issue yet to be addressed is the capacity of a response to take into 
account the walking well—potentially the greatest number of patients generated during 
an act of bioterrorism.
Victim Typologies: According to the ‘Severity Predictor for Mass Trauma Events’ 
(CDC) there are two major types of victims that will be generated during a bioterrorist 
event – critical and non-critical.  Critical victims, those that are either dead or terminal, 
those in immediate need of care and those that are admitted on a delayed basis are 
predicted to account for one-third of the casualties.  Non-critical victims (Figure 8), 
those that need less acute or minimal care are predicted to account for two-thirds 
casualties generated during an event.  The Centers for Disease Control also predicts 
that patterns of casualties may double if the event entails the use of manufactured 
weapons (such as fi re arms), an explosion in a confi ned space, or the collapse of a 
building.  The most common misconception of existing resources and their ability to 
respond is that existing healthcare facilities will be prepared to handle large numbers 
of acutely ill or injured patients” (Hanfl ing, 129).  Many hospitals can already handle 
Figure 8, Non Critical Patients
8. google.com
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critical patients predicted during a bioterrorist event yet they are not equipped with 
the necessary spatial and material capabilities needed to provide care to all potential 
(critical and non-critical victims).  Minimal additional architectural interventions 
are needed to meet the needs of critical patients within a hospital.  An architectural 
response located within healthcare facilities is not only expensive, but it is impractical 
to assume that architecturally the needs of all victims can be met within a healthcare 
facility.  It is potentially more effective and less costly to meets the needs of non-critical 
patients away from the healthcare facility.  To allow healthcare facilities to focus on 
providing care to critical victims, the needs of non-critical and the walking well must 
be addressed away from healthcare facilities.  The greatest need for an architectural 
response and capital investment is on addressing the non-critical needs of the largest 
number of potential victims--the walking well.
Walking Well:  In addition to critical and non-critical victims produced by an event 
the greatest number of victims who will present during an attack are the walking well. 
The walking well can be defi ned as people who will present themselves for medical 
care both with and without symptoms consistent with exposure.  During an event, 
33
people who suspect they are infected will greatly outnumber those who are in actuality 
symptomatic and potentially critically ill.  During the 1995 Tokyo subway (Figure 9) 
attack by the Aum Shinrikyo terrorists, the walking well turned out to be nearly 4,500 
of the approximate 5,000 reported casualties.  It is believed that “for every casualty 
injured or infected, hundreds more may seek evaluation” (Hick, 5).  It is estimated 
that the number of walking well may exceed the number of exposed victims by 5 to 
15 times.  The potentially large number of unverifi ed victims who may show up at 
hospital emergency departments have a great potential to inundate healthcare facilities 
and emergency response during a bioterrorist attack, and therefore provide the biggest 
challenge to any response effort.  In order to allow the healthcare system and emergency 
responders to effectively respond to the needs of critical and non-critical victims, a 
response must be designed to identify and meet the needs of the walking well before 
they arrive at area hospitals.
Panic and Fear:  Panic and fear (Figure 10) will be most evident during an event and 
“the widespread terror caused by the use of (bioterrorism) weapons could complicate 
response needs” (Macintyre, 243).  The general public lacks knowledge of the agents Figure 10, Panic and Fear
Figure 9, Tokyo Subway Attack
9. google.com
10. Dan Hanfl ing
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potentially to be used during an attack.  Currently, there is little understanding of the 
details of how biological and chemical agents are spread, what the symptoms are, and 
what (typical) outcomes entail.  It is predicted that the walking well will assume the 
worst case scenarios due to their lack of knowledge.
During an attack of bioterrorism, panic can be reduced by “reinforcing the public’s sense 
of control” through more obtainable access to self diagnosis services and opportunities 
to remotely receive event related information (Glass, 3).  Providing the public with 
information pertinent to what is taking place around them during an unfamiliar event 
can alleviate a great deal of fear and panic.  A response that addresses the needs of the 
walking well can potentially reduce the probability of those not requiring treatment from 
inundating healthcare facilities—so health care responders can focus their resources on 
treating those actually infected.  Similarly a dispersed diagnostic response can allow 
people to better identify their individual medical needs and take appropriate actions 
rather than rely on emergency responders or medical staff who during an event will 
need to be focused on administering treatment to critical patients.
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Predicted Incidents
A bioterrorism event can include the use of chemical, biological or radiological agents as 
weapons. Biological and chemical agents are considered the most obtainable weapons 
of mass destruction and will be the focus of this thesis. The potential impact of any type 
of incident is immense due to the fact that “there is little or no ability to anticipate a 
chemical or biological attack, little or no ability to detect one if it occurs, and little ability 
to manage the consequences” (American Health Consultants, 5).  It is nearly impossible 
to contain an agent from spreading throughout an environment, especially those that 
occur outside of buildings; therefore these agents are capable of spreading throughout 
a context very easily.  With the exception of a few chemical agents, most weapons 
(chemical and biological) used during a bioterrorist event are generally invisible and 
odorless making detection without the assistance of special equipment (Figure 11) 
diffi cult.  Chemical and biological weapons impact their victims differently including 
the length of time before symptoms present themselves and the way in which an agent 
is transferred from victim to victim.  The delivery of care for each type of weapon has 
several variables such as the need for immunization or immediate decontamination 
(Figure 12) as well as the type of symptoms that occur after the contact with a weapon 






Chemical Incidents: (Figure 13) Due to their ability to produce an almost instant reaction, 
chemical agents are weapons of immediacy.  Generally, these types of bioterrorist 
weapons are odorless and colorless therefore having the greatest ability to incapacitate 
those that come in contact.  Identifying the total physical area that may or may not be 
contaminated is problematic as most agents are not capable of being detected without 
the assistance of technology.  In high risk urban environments technological devices are 
assisting law enforcement and public health offi cials in the (constant) monitoring and 
real time evaluation of air quality.  Devices are located discretely throughout populated, 
high threat areas, such as the National Mall (Figure 14), or Metro (transportation) system 
(Figure 15) in Washington, D.C.  These types of systems alert offi cials if a chemical 
agent has been released into the environment at a higher than anticipated level.
Chemical agents have the greatest ability to immediately impact the human body; 
however it is possible for some types of chemical agents to take several hours to days 
(at most) to become recognizable.  Victims that have been exposed to a chemical agent 
need to be immediately decontaminated before the chemical agent further infects their 
Figure 13, Variables related to chemical agents
13.  Personal Image
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body.  Due to the likelihood of traumatic stress that chemical weapons pose to the body, 
a response should be activated and primary emergency care such as decontamination 
should be delivered at the epicenter.  It is important to remove the agent from direct 
contact with the victim to limit its impact as well as minimize the exposure of healthcare 
and emergency responders treating the victims.  Delivering care at an epicenter allows 
less severe victims to also be decontaminated and initially treated before they disperse 
throughout a context.
The primary programmatic response to a chemical attack is decontamination (Figure 
16) the process of physically removing (by washing) an agent from an exposed victim. 
The process of decontamination includes the removal and disposal of clothing, a series 
of showers that use a mixture of water and disinfecting products, and re-gowning. 
It is signifi cant to provide care at the epicenter immediately due to the fact that 
decontamination resources available at nearby healthcare facilities would probably be 
insignifi cant in size to meet the demands of patients (including non-critical, and the 
walking well) predicted to present during a large scale event.  Healthcare facilities 
today are typically equipped with small decontamination showers located at the Figure 15, Transportation System 




entrance to an emergency department, a centralized response location.  With the system 
of response that exists today, after “the release of a chemical weapon in a populated 
area, casualties may present en masse with little or no advance notifi cation’ (Macintyre, 
242) potentially inundating existing emergency response capabilities.  By deploying 
decontamination resources and capabilities at the epicenter once a release of a chemical 
event has been identifi ed, healthcare facilities can more adequately respond to victims 
who may need more sophisticated follow up care.
The release of a chemical agent can also impact the population located outside of the 
immediate epicenter; these probable victims will typically not have an immediate 
awareness of their exposure due to their location relative to the epicenter.  Therefore, 
the potential is high for infected victims to disperse throughout a context.  Despite 
diffi culty of containing all infected patients at the event site, the further dispersion of 
an agent is somewhat inhibited by the low probability of spreading a chemical agent 
through casual person-to-person contact.  Residue from the release of an agent typically 
is present within a victims clothing but can not be spread to an uninfected person through 
casual physical contact.  Allocating treatment at the epicenter can minimize the number 
Figure 16, Typical Decontamination Equipment
16.  google.com
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of patients dispersing beyond exposed areas during a chemical attack. The ability for 
any response to activate immediately once a chemical agent has been dispersed and 
recognized is signifi cant because the symptoms will begin their onset within victims 
immediately upon exposure.  Treatment in the form of decontamination should occur 
immediately so that symptoms do not progress unnecessarily.
Biological Agents: (Figure 17) Considering the ability biological agents to incubate 
within their victims for several days before their onset and presence is known, biological 
agents are weapons with a delayed but potentially larger and more prolonged impact. 
Biological agents appeal to terrorists because of the inability to quickly detect their 
presence, therefore allowing no trace of the initial release and source.  Not only are 
biological agents obtainable, they are attractive due to that fact that “in many instances, 
these weapons are relatively easy to produce, inexpensive and can be deployed covertly” 
(Macintyre, 243).
The potential for a bioterrorist attack to have a greater impact manifests itself in the 
nature of our society.  Our culture is very transient which increases the potential impact 
Figure 17, Variables related to biological agents
17.  Personal Image
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of a biological attack.  Once an agent is released, infected people could disperse 
without knowing that they were exposed, increasing the potential impact of the event 
dramatically.  People leave the epicenter infected, and traverse throughout densely 
populated settings such as stores, airports, transit systems, schools, etc unknowingly 
exposing those around them.  An appealing aspect of biological agents is the probable 
dispersion of disease through the mobility of its victims “the fact that the victims are 
on the move, dispersing around the country or even around the world” (Osterholm, 
71).  Despite the possibility for an agent to spread throughout a geographical area 
within its victims, most biological agents can not be transferred through casual contact. 
In order for an agent to spread, infected bodily fl uids must infect new victims; this 
often requires a long face to face contact in a confi ned/crowded setting, such as trains, 
subways, airplane, buses, cues at platforms and ticketing counters, with little airfl ow, 
between an infected victim and a potential secondary victim. 
The symptomatic conditions of biological agents and the similarities they share with the 
‘common fl u’ increase the appeal of releasing biological agents—medical staff typically 
do not diagnose exposure to a biological agent until several days after numerous patients 
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with similar symptoms begin to present themselves.  Thus, “the only certain way to 
detect the agent is through the eventual presentation of symptoms and then diagnostic 
testing which will be retrospective for most casualties “(American Health Consultants, 
5).  Once an agent has been confi rmed to the public, fear and panic will be exhibited 
by the general population including those not exposed.  It is unlike a chemical attack 
where the epicenter can be identifi ed and patients can more easily be tracked. A large 
number of widely dispersed biological event victims will be generated because of the 
inability to determine the defi nitive area of release.  A response to bioterrorism must 
therefore be dispersed throughout a larger context similar to the manner in which the 
agent disperses in order to reach the highest number of potential victims.
A signifi cant programmatic response to bioterrorism includes isolation of exposed 
critical victims; however this is not the primary architectural and interventional needs 
due to the fact that the majority of people who may seek treatment will in fact be the 
walking well. Isolation can be administered at hospitals for critical victims and larger 
numbers of non-critical victims can be held in isolation for observation purposes at 
alternative care locations such as designated hotels, and clinics throughout a context. 
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In addition to the obvious need for isolation, the primary programmatic response for a 
biological incident is diagnosis and triage.  During triage (the initial stage of delivery) 
it would be determined whether or not a patient has been exposed based on simple vital 
statistic monitoring.  Care varies depending on the degree of onset once a patient has 
been diagnosed. Most victims are immunized and discharged unless their symptoms 
have progressed to a critical stage in which case they would be admitted to a healthcare 
facility where they would be placed in isolation.  It is reasonable to assume that primary 
care for non-symptomatic patients can be administered at alternative care locations 
and dispersed response settings, allowing healthcare facilities to focus on the delivery 
of care to critical victims whose exposure has progressed to the point of recognizable 
symptoms needing treatment and isolation. 
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Predicted Scenarios
Many types of probable scenarios could be executed with bioterrorism producing 
a great impact on the population.  When selecting a target, (bio) terrorists can be 
reasonably assumed to target a multitude of location types.  “In a terrorist’s eyes, the 
higher the profi le of the attack site, the more attraction” (Osterholm, 71).  Potential 
high profi le attacks sites include transportation networks (Figure 18), spaces (both 
interior and exterior) in which large gatherings take place (Figure 19), as well as high 
profi le (federal) buildings (Figure 20).  Despite these criteria, a terrorist may attack any 
number of related or unrelated locations in addition to those listed above. According 
to the United States Department of Homeland Security “attacks by international and 
domestic terrorists have demonstrated that no location is immune (to attack)” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 13) therefore safeguarding a specifi c type of 
locations is irrelevant when establishing response strategies for a bioterrorist attack—a 
response should therefore be dispersed and able to adapt to the demands of various 
types of scenarios.
Figure 19, National Mall, Washington, D.C.
19. google.com
Figure 18, Transit Network  
18.  Personal Image
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The density of an urban context can be considered an ideal location for bioterrorism 
because of the many probable locations for an event to be initiated.  People in cities 
are mobile—many commute to surrounding suburbs or are visiting from other places. 
In regards to the way that we build cities, “vast spread out, and prosperous, these 
highways, clusters of offi ce towers, mega malls and suburbs, each feeding on the other” 
(Osterholm, 73) make cities ideal targets for promoting the most devastating movement 
of a disease.  Any attack of bioterrorism would be exemplifi ed by the high number of 
people that could potentially be infected if an attack were to take place within an urban 
context.




Any architectural and sytstemic response to bioterrorism must have some scale-ability 
of  response during the timeline of a bioterrorist attack allowing response efforts to 
fl uctuate with the demands of patient fl ow (or lack there of).  Current technology 
allows executives and offi cials the opportunity to illustrate and play out potiential and 
probable scenarios and event timelines, either practically or virtually, and evaluate their 
performance before, during and after their conclusion.  By performing these exercises 
(Figure 21, Figure 22) offi cials can begin to understand efforts necessary to establish a 
strategic plan.  The federal government has tested the capability of existing resources 
during several national exerises.  This thesis will adapt the framework and assumptions 
for these exercises to Washington, D.C. and will set forth the criteria for testing proposed 
systemic as well as architectural responses to bioterrorism through the utilization of 
existing infrastructure within an urban context.
Prior to the establishment of federal mock-events, no exercise had tested how existing 
systems would respond to an event of bioterrorism.  Federal mock events take into 
account efforts made by all possible players including healthcare facilities and emergency 
Figure 21, Mock Chemical Incident




responders.  During the initial events it was evident that no component as a single entity 
would be able to handle full responsibility, therefore coordination was necessary so that 
each type of responder could focus on responding effi ciently.  Federal exercises known 
as TOPOFF (‘Top Offi cials’) exercises (Figure 23), set forth by the federal government 
in part because the “people who would truly be making the decisions in a real event had 
never had the chance to become familiar with procedures and protocols” (McBaugh,1). 
These types of exercises allow key players the opportunity to see how things will play 
out in a situation less stressful then the chaos predicted to occur during an actual attack. 
TOPOFF exercises are considered to be “the most comprehensive and ‘real’ test of 
local, state and national response capabilities ever conducted in our nation’s history” 
(McBaugh, 1) and past exercises exhibited both weaknesses and strengths of existing 
responders.  Post event evaluations proved that performing these types of exercises 
was signifi cant in establishing and designing comprehensive, coordinated responses 
between agencies designated to respond.  Emergency responders were made aware of 
partnerships and the roles that each one would play during the timeline of the entire 
exercise.  Despite the efforts being made by responders, many gaps still lie in the overall 
response strategy because responders are developing individual plans that are therefore 
redundant and not a comprehensive of the abilities of all typologies of responders.
Figure 23, TOPOFF Exercise
23. dhs.gov
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Timelines taken from Questerra, Center for Strategic and International Studies and 
Biohazard News for two events will be used as a general framework for establishing 
an evaluation of the proposed architectural and systemic response in this thesis.  Any 
response must not only take into account the ability of each responder as a single entity, 
but more importantly a response should take into account providing a solution that 
allows both healthcare facilities and emergency responders to focus on providing a 
effective response.  The major variables that can potentially inhibit responders from 
reacting effectively to an event are the number and role of people who will need to be 
seen in any one location.  A systemic and architectural response to bioterrorism should 
take into account the incorporation of various types of decentralized, activated and 
deployable responders within an urban context external including existing healthcare 
and emergency response services.
The two most predicted typologies of a bioterrorist attacks will be studied in this 
thesis--a chemical attack, as well as the release of a biological agent.  The events 
will vary in size so that the ability of the proposed response will be examined on two 
different scales in an attempt to illustrate the capability of the proposed systemic and 
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architectural response.  This thesis will also assume that the role of existing emergency 
responders and existing networks of response will be present during a response.  The 
chemical event will assume a smaller number of patients in a concentrated area, and the 
biological event will assume a greater number of exposed victims throughout a broader 
context.  Due to the response time difference and identifi cation of chemical (immediate 
response) and biological (delayed response) attacks, the timeline for each scenario will 
vary.  The chemical event will only last for three days, where the biological attack 
will continue for twelve days.  These two events are very dissimilar and were chosen 
to consider the ability of the proposed systemic and architectural response under two 
variable conditions.  Despite the dissimilarities between the two events chosen to test 
the proposed response (different agents, different length of response time, different 
number of patients and walking well, and different type of response) both were chosen 
because they are predicted to be the most likely type of bioterrorist event that may 
occur.  (Figure 24)
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Figure 24, Comparison of Scenarios
24. Personal Image
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Events Scenario 1, A Chemical Attack on the National Mall:  The fi rst event study, a 
chemical release (mustard gas) on the National Mall, is an outdoor setting.  The National 
Mall is located in an area of Washington DC where there are many predicted potential 
targets of attack including prominent Federal buildings within close proximity—
including Capitol Hill (Figure 26), and the White House.  The target site is a heavily 
populated area, as the National Mall on a daily basis attracts many tourists.  The urban 
district surrounding the epicenter of this event contains many museums, and outdoor 
monuments.  (Figure 25)
This event provides an opportunity to consider the ability of the proposed architectural 
and systemic response to address the needs of a small event, with only 150 people 
at the event epicenter actually exposed to the agent—fi fty of which are diagnoses in 
critical condition.  The duration of the event will last for three days, and will require an 
immediate response.  The response context in this case will be located at the epicenter 
and will utilize existing response resources including the National Metropolitan 
Response Team (NMRT).  The primary delivery of care that will be administered at the 
epicenter would be decontamination.  Critical patients in need of further care would be 
Figure 26, Capitol Hill
26. google.com
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transported to a local healthcare facility by existing emergency responders.  Despite the 
delivery of care at the epicenter, people at the periphery of the event will likely disperse 
throughout the urban context and be informed of the event through the activation of 
architectural and technological interventions within the immediate context including 
public health information, and self-diagnosis. Diagnostic capabilities can serve these 
people who will likely think they have been infected in an effort to minimize mass 
hysteria in the general population from inundating existing healthcare facilities as well 
at the epicenter of the event.
This event scenario will be used to study how an architectural and systemic response 
could activate immediately and serve a potentially high number of  victims (critical, 
non-critical and the walking well) within a short duration of time.  It also illustrates 
how existing resources (NMRT) would be integrated into the timeline of response.
Event Scenario 2, Anthrax released during an event at RFK Stadium:  The second 
event study is located within a large outdoor context that includes not only the stadium, 
but the immediate urban context that surrounds it as well as the larger metro region, 
specifi cally Maryland and Virginia.  (Figure 25)
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This event tests the ability of an architectural and systemic response to react to a 
large patient population.  During the time in which the agent is released, a population 
of 50,000 attendees is assumed to be at RFK, 10,000 of which will be diagnosed as 
critical, in addition to 3,000 (critical) residents from the surrounding residential areas. 
(Figure 27) The agent and the release are not identifi ed immediately, and go unnoticed 
for several days until patients begin to present themselves at local healthcare facilities 
with symptoms of the fl u.  The time between the release of a biological agent and 
recognition can be a matter of days, unlike the immediate recognition of a chemical 
agent.  The delay between release and recognition allows victims to disperse throughout 
the immediate urban context (Washington DC) and the surrounding metropolitan area 
(Maryland and Virginia); therefore they cannot be as easily and quickly contained and 
identifi ed as they can be during a chemical release.  The delay in recognition will 
inherently produce thousands of walking well; as a result hundreds of alternative care 
locations (varying in size) will potentially need to be activated to prevent this patient 
population from presenting themselves at healthcare facilities.  The primary delivery 
of care at alternative care locations and kiosks within the metro stations will include 
triage.  Alternative care locations will potentially provide antibiotics and immunization 
27. Personal Image
Figure 27, Population Density Surrounding 
Biological Event Epicenter
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to diagnosed patients.  In order to supplement care at established health facilities and 
alternative care locations the primary architectural and systemic response interventions 
proposed in this thesis will include sites for obtaining and disseminating public health 
information, and opportunities for self diagnosis, including thermal scans and self-
diagnosis terminals at a dispersed level throughout the DC urban context.  These sites will 
provide an opportunity for potential victims and the walking well who have dispersed 
from the initial epicenter to determine whether or not they have been exposed.
This event is architecturally and systemically signifi cant because of the prolonged 
timeline, and the high number of victims (primarily the walking well) that will utilize 
the response.  An architectural response to a biological attack will need to be able 
to quickly adapt existing non-traditional healthcare settings and be able to sustain a 
response over a prolonged period of time.  Programmatic responses will need to adapt 
to their inconsistent, unpredictable physical environments repeatedly throughout an 
urban context.  For example triage within a school cafeteria varies in confi guration to 
that provided within a large arena. A response to a biological event will be activated on 
a widely dispersed level throughout the entire urban context, and will serve a potentially 
high number of walking well over an extended period of time.
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Existing Response Context
Healthcare facilities are inadequately prepared to respond to bioterrorism due to a lack 
of physical space and staffi ng as well as the inability to stockpile supplies.  During an 
event of bioterrorism, healthcare facilities are currently assumed to be able to “care for 
overwhelming numbers of patients; manage shortages of personnel, medicines, and 
equipment; and provide the security needed for crowd control, for the provision of 
safety for healthcare workers and patients, and even perhaps for the enforcement of 
mandatory isolation of contagious patients”  (Inglesby, 443).  The low probability, high 
consequence nature of bioterrorism makes it impractical and fi nancially overwhelming 
for all potential response hospitals to become all risks ready.  The reality is that 
healthcare facilities are “an essential component of the emergency response system 
and at the present are poorly prepared for such incidents” (Macintyre, 1).  Inherently 
hospitals provide concentrated urgent, acute and ambulatory care services and are 
somewhat dispersed throughout an urban context but not in a strategic way.  Relying 
on healthcare facilities to provide care for all real and imagined victims is unrealistic 
planning for such an unpredictable event. Any response to bioterrorism must also take 
into account decentralized locations and existing resources identifi ed, organized and 
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distributed broadly throughout a threat context so that the greatest number of victims 
can be treated.
Mass Casualty:  Typical spatial and clinical resources within hospitals lack the ability 
to meet the projected demands associated with a potential mass casualty event such as 
a bioterrorist attack.  There is a signifi cant gap between existing resource allocation 
and the projected demands associated with all predicted mass casualty typologies—
especially the perceived needs of the walking well (Figure 28).  Generally, localities 
defi ne a ‘mass casualty event’ as one with more than a dozen casualties; far less than 
an intentional release could cause (Siegrist, 3).  Most hospitals on a daily basis face the 
strategic challenges of being ‘at capacity’ with a number of patients entering through 
the emergency department that is far fewer than those expected to arrive due to a 
bioterrorist attack.  Healthcare facilities “lack the capacity to cope with an unexpected 
surge in patients” (Glass, 4). During an episodic event, such as a bioterrorist attack, 
hospitals are at best typically prepared for limited “mass” casualties.  Throughout the 
TOPOFF exercise healthcare facility capability was tested:




far more patients than they could manage. In the beginning, two to 
three times normal volumes and later up to ten times normal volumes 
were converging on health care facilities”  (Inglesby, 4). 
The impending threat of a bioterrorist attack has redefi ned mass casualty in theory and 
the way in which actual emergency care is delivered in an effort to incorporate the need 
for high surge capacity.  Most hospitals, especially those within an urban context lack 
the physical ability to grow and expand to meet the demands of the resulting surge of 
patients during an event of bioterrorism.  Response strategies need to expand beyond the 
capabilities of existing healthcare facilities in order to meet the demands of all potential 
victims of a bioterrorist attack.  Response strategies need to include alternative care 
locations such as schools, hotels, and arenas dispersed throughout an urban context that 
can be quickly converted as appropriate to accommodate the predicted demands of mass 
casualties within an urban context to serve as nontraditional healthcare settings during 
an event.  Traditional models of healthcare should take into account the unpredictability 
of scope and location of an attack and should therefore be capable of extending beyond 
the walls of a hospital in order to provide a dispersed response within an urban context 
that meet the demands of all potential victim typologies during a bioterrorist attack.
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Emergency Response Options: Emergency Departments (EDs) do not have the capability 
to provide emergency response options to meet the demands of all variables related 
to a bioterrorist attack.  Currently “the majority of Emergency Departments (EDs) 
are not prepared for this type of event (incident) should it happen today” (American 
Health Consultants, 95).  It is impossible to think that all emergency departments will 
fi nancially be able to prepare and safeguard for all variables of a bioterrorist attack, in 
part because of the low probability occurrence of an event in any given location.
Hospital emergency department facilities are specifi cally  inadequate for providing 
response options during a chemical attack as, “many healthcare facilities are poorly 
prepared for the decontamination requirements of even small scale HAZMAT 
incidents” (Macintyre, 243).  Typically EDs are equipped with a single occupancy 
decontamination shower (Figure 29) located near the ambulatory entrance; this model 
is geared toward industrial accidents and only capable of handling one person at a 
time during minor emergencies such a single patient exposure to a hazardous material. 
Furthermore decontamination while a necessary component of a chemical attack, is 
not programmatically needed during the administering of care for patients exposed to 
a biological agent.
Figure 29, Decontamination Shower
29. Personal Image
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During a biological release, triage would be the most common programmatic function 
delivered to the greatest number of patients.  Typically EDs are equipped with few 
triage bays, generally a number far less than what would be needed to respond to the 
predicted number of victims during an event.  The vast majority of potential victims 
needing screening and initial diagnosis should not have to rely on seeking care from a 
healthcare facility that would quickly be at capacity and therefore unable to deliver care 
within an adequate amount of time.
In some instances, healthcare facilities are preparing themselves for a bioterrorist attack 
by equipping their emergency department with a typically small scale mobile response 
unit, such as a trailer (Figure 30), or shipping container, that remains dormant during 
normal operations but can be activated or deployed as needed during a surge event. 
These units contain shelter components (such as a tent) and medical equipment needed 
to provide a response during a surge event.  These types of response units are usually 
equipped with temporary shower structures to provide decontamination during a 
chemical event.  Most of the equipment stored within these types of containers pertains 
only to chemical attack response efforts; during a biological attack however, the shelter 
Figure 30, Typical Mobile Response
30. Personal Image
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component stored within these containers could be utilized to support alternative care 
locations.  (Figure 31) Containers used to store equipment and supplies, whether trailers 
or shipping containers latently serve as equipment storage; the physical structure of the 
container wouldn’t provide adequate area to assist in the delivery of care when the 
supplied within the container were activated.
During an event these units can either be used on site (within a medical campus) as 
an immediate extension of a response offered by an ED or transported to an offsite 
care location such as the epicenter.  Mobile units would also have the ability to be 
an extension of care delivered at alternative care locations, such as clinics, schools, 
arenas or hotels—the type of response at these locations would depend on the type of 
event.  Mobile models deployed throughout an urban context during a response could 
potentially alleviate pressure otherwise placed on hospitals by less acute victims and 
the walking well.  A response to a chemical attack may require that a unit be deployed 
to an epicenter so that critical patients are treated before they are transported and are 
immediately decontaminated onsite.  A biological attack, primarily because of the time 




activated onsite at a healthcare facility or alternative location (school, hotel, clinic, 
etc.) and serve as an extension of existing services such as triage.  Factors such as scale 
and type of event and dispersion of victim population will determine whether or not 
mobile units should be deployed or remain at an established response location such as 
a hospital.  Other types of response can be activated throughout a context with minimal 
human assistance in order to provide public health information, self diagnosis, and 
wayfi nding to potential victims, and the walking well.
Regardless of its activated location, mobile units need resources—electric, water and 
communication lines to operate during an attack.  Gaining access to these resources 
when a mobile unit is activated at an existing facility is obtainable; if a mobile unit 
is going to be activated remote from a conventional healthcare facility or alternative 
care site, the same basic resources must be available for the delivery of care to take 
place.  Offsite locations where mobile units may be activated is hard to predict prior 
to an event, therefore this type of response “may present logistic challenges, such as 
availability of plumbing and water” (Hick, 6).  Mobile units deployed to an off site 
location, such as the epicenter, would be primarily used during a chemical event to 
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provide decontamination to patients.  Units deployed to administer decontamination 
can not function without access to a water source.  It can be assumed that deployed 
units would utilize fi re hydrants and have the capability to be hooked up to existing 
or portable sources of electric power as needed.  The availability of resources during 
a response activated at an offsite location should be considered so that mobile models 
are reliable and effi cient in establishing a response setting.
Current mobile units must be able to adapt to the location in which they are activated. 
For example, they can be activated in open plazas, parks and even on streets with the 
assumption that road closures will occur during an event.  During an attack a mobile 
responses can function as an individual entity or as an extension of a care or alternative 
care locations established as part of the urban infrastructure.  It is unpredictable where 
a response will need to occur therefore any component of response will need to be 
adaptive to all potential environments in which care could be delivered.
Existing Emergency Responders:  During an act of bioterrorism current Federal 
emergency response plans currently incorporate the capability of various types of 
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emergency responders including fi re, rescue, and law enforcement, emergency response 
medical staff, local ED’s as well as HAZMAT teams previously mentioned in this 
thesis.  Emergency responders have the potential capability of immediately arriving at 
the epicenter and to administer initial care.
Like hospitals, emergency responders can not function as single entities in isolation 
and be capable of providing care to all victims generated during either a chemical 
or a biological attack.  They are currently integrated through an established network 
of communication so that each component has an immediate awareness of current 
emergency situations, and the involvement needed.  For example, during an emergency 
response in which medical care is administered, victims may need to be transported to 
a healthcare facility.  The emergency response network control center  has the ability 
to communicate with hospitals to determine availability as well as make them aware 
when patients will arrive, and their medical status.  Each emergency responder would 
have a role during both typologies of event similar to the type of response that they 
currently perform.
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HAZMAT teams (Figure 32, Figure 33) also typically exist within a response network. 
This type of responder is activated during situations in which a hazardous material 
may need to be contained, or removed.  Similarly, they have the ability to treat victims 
that have been exposed to hazardous materials.  HAZMAT teams, by the conditions in 
which they were designed to respond to, are prepared and heavily equipped to handle 
variables related specifi cally to a chemical attack.  HAZMAT teams also coordinate 
a cohesive and communicative response with all components of emergency response 
including healthcare facilities during a response situation.
HAMZAT teams are specially created to have the ability to provide decontamination 
during a chemical event.  A response that focuses on providing decontamination is not 
adequate for a biological attack.  Triage and immunization are the primary programmatic 
responses needed for a biological attack.  According to a bioterrorist specialist, “the 
most important fl aw is the fact that the HAZMAT model does not address the use 
of biological agents,” more specifi cally “traditional HAZMAT products, such as 
decontamination tents, trailers and isolation rooms, are expensive, require prolonged 
setup time or are inadequate for large numbers of patients” (Macintyre, 243).
Figure 32, Hazmat Teams




During a response to a chemical attack it can be assumed that critical patients will 
be treated at the epicenter by responders such as HAZMAT teams; yet it can also be 
assumed that all remaining victims will not be treated and decontaminated by HAZMAT 
teams at the epicenter.  HAZMAT teams are adequate resources to specifi cally treat 
critical patients—a much smaller patient population than the walking well who can be 
more appropriately addressed at dispersed locations throughout the event context.
Post September 11, provisions for emergency responders were reconsidered by federal 
agencies.  This includes “efforts to increase federal, state and local response capabilities, 
develop response teams of medical professionals, increase availability of medical 
treatments, participate in and sponsor terrorism response exercises, plan to aid victims, 
and provide support during special events such as presidential inaugurations, major 
political party conventions” (Heinrich, 5).  The National Metropolitan Response Team 
(NMRT), located in Arlington, Virginia, is an example of a federally funded response 
team (Figure 34, Figure 35).  Established by the Department of Homeland Security, 
NMRT is comprised of volunteer on call fi rst responders (fi re, EMS, law enforcement) 
Figure 34, NMRT onsite




and healthcare personnel.  During an instance of terrorism (such as September 11) within 
the D.C. metropolitan area, NMRT responders are alerted.  Once notifi ed, all responders 
convene at NMRT (in Arlington) and dispatch to the epicenter or response location 
jointly where they set up an area to provide large scale decontamination and triage.  In 
some instances NMRT is also deployed prior to high security events within Washington, 
D.C. as a means of preparation for potentially high risk scenarios of bioterrorism such 
as large gatherings on the National Mall, or political events similar to an inauguration. 
NMRT is equipped with the necessary supplies to provide decontamination, as well 
as medical resources and personnel to administer the immunization, and treatment to 
a patient population larger than most local responders would be capable of during a 
bioterrorist event including critical and non-critical patients.
NMRT was designed with the intention of providing response during worst case, 
bioterrorist scenarios such as an attack during a high profi le event in Washington DC 
where large numbers of patients could potentially be generated.  NMRT is an excellent 
mobilized model of response capable of providing large scale decontamination quickly 
during a chemical attack due to their ability to be self-sustaining without connecting 
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to existing electrical and water resources.  Additional response proposals need not 
duplicate or overlap with the responsibilities of the NMRT to provide decontamination 
during a chemical event.  The NMRT must be considered as a component and model of 
response during strategic planning for a bioterrorist event.
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Inadequate Integration
While certain healthcare and emergency response models may adequately respond 
to the needs of bioterrorism in certain places under specifi c conditions, there is no 
fully developed systemic response capability designed to handle the predicted range 
of potential scenarios, locations and scales of events.  One major fl aw in a systemic 
response strategy is that healthcare facilities and emergency response options are not 
adequately integrated.  For a suffi cient response to occur during a bioterrorist attack, 
healthcare facilities and emergency responders need to be consistent and coordinated 
in their planning efforts and integrated in the manner in which they respond so that 
redundancy does not occur.
Based on the fact that the “healthcare system is often operating at or over capacity daily, 
we will never have the resources to be prepared for every disaster, but with appropriate 
partnerships, incident management systems and a tiered response framework, we can 
be prepared to respond to any challenge” (Hick, 9).  Appropriate partnerships include 
emergency responders and healthcare facility medical staff working together at a 
localized level in order to establish a familiarity of responsibilities and a relationship 
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prior to an event.  During the Topoff Exercise new working relationships between 
responders and larger national agencies were defi ned; ‘although hospitals and local 
and state health agencies often collaborate with the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention in controlling an epidemic, (we) were unaccustomed to working closely 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Attorney’ and other major Federal 
Agencies (Hoffman, 1).  All types of responders must be coordinated; in particular the 
relationship between emergency responders who will administer decontamination at 
the epicenter during a chemical attack and healthcare facilities that will be receiving 
critical patients from the epicenter is necessary.  In an effort to assist in mitigating the 
needs of the walking well throughout an urban context so that this particular patient 
typology won’t inundate and seek care from traditional healthcare facilities, public 
health information and crowd control must be provided through the coordination of law 
enforcement and public health departments.
During an event all responders should understand their role and responsibility allowing 
each individual entity to focus on their role in the delivery of care to victims.  
An incident management system and a tiered to plan of action would establish a 
framework for response efforts by allocating the accountability of individual responding 
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agencies.  As well as defi ning roles and responsibilities during an emergency, all 
responders identifi ed in a tiered response should have an understanding not only of 
their individual responsibility, but also who they should be communicating with during 
a response effort and what roles and responsibilities other agencies are accountable for. 
During the Topoff exercise despite the fact that roles of authority were defi ned ‘much 
time was spent in consultation and debate (regarding roles and responsibilities) through 
scheduled (bridge) calls’ therefore decision making became ‘ineffi cient’ (Inglesby, 2). 
It became very evident that during an event ‘a central location for face-to-face meetings 
should be large enough to accommodate representatives from all agencies involved’ 
(Ingelsby, 2).  It is also necessary that emergency strategies are outlined prior to an event 
so that responders are able to focus on the responsibility of providing care rather than 
trying to understand strategic framework challenges during the chaos of an event.
There is a signifi cant disjoint between healthcare facilities, and emergency response 
options.  During the Topoff exercise Emergency Operation Centers (EOGs) were 
defi ned by federal, state and local agencies prior to the event in an effort to establish 
a central network control center ; during the response “many participants indicated 
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that it was unclear how these EOGs would interact with each other, with hospitals 
and public health offi cials” (Grossman, 1).  Therefore despite the fact that a common 
communication system was established, all responders need to understand the role 
that a network control center  plays during a response in order for efforts to not be 
redundant.  A signifi cant problem today manifests in the fact that “healthcare delivery 
systems, not to mention municipal public safety and public health agencies tend to 
plan and respond to emergency events as individual entities, not as part of a larger 
system” (Hanfl ing, 136).  With individual efforts and response plans activated during 
a bioterrorist attack, a response will not be executed successfully—each agency and 
type of responder will be reacting in an individualized manner, and as a result many 
efforts will be either be duplicated or neglected and therefore not provided.  Prior to a 
bioterrorist event “cooperative planning between healthcare organizations, and public 
health agencies, along with the remainder of the traditional fi rst responder community 
including representatives from public safety and emergency management must become 
a cornerstone in the development of any comprehensive emergency response plan” 
(Hanfl ing, 136).  A comprehensive response to bioterrorism integrates all potential fi rst 
responders and receivers so that their efforts and skills are coordinated successfully, a 
line of communication is established and a viable response plan is outlined.
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A Systemic and Architectural Response
Bioterrorism presents many strategic challenges for a systemic response that must 
coordinate the efforts between healthcare facilities and emergency response resources.  In 
particular, the most signifi cant systemic and architectural oversight remains addressing 
the needs of the walking well—victims who will present themselves for medical care 
both with and without symptoms consistent with exposure.  During an event, these 
victims will greatly outnumber those who are in actuality symptomatic and potentially 
critically ill.  The walking well were taken into account during the Topoff exercise:
“By the end of the exercise, on hospital had (notionally) seen an 
incredible 3,787 persons since the beginning of the exercise (only a few 
days earlier.  Of these, some 3,200 were ‘worried well’—persons who 
did not truly have the pneumonic plague but were worried that they 
might have the disease of be developing it” (Inglesby, 441) 
Furthermore, the Topoff exercise ‘did not address how healthcare facilities would 
distinguish between uninfected ‘worried well’, those with incubating or early 
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symptoms of plague, and those with other illnesses’ (Inglesby, 441).  A response must 
take into account the potential of the walking well to inundate the healthcare system 
by providing a programmatic response specifi c to their needs, dispersed throughout 
any potential threat context and removed from the vicinity of healthcare facilities.  A 
systemic and architectural response to bioterrorism—an unpredictable, low probability, 
high consequence event, must be systemic, dispersed, fl exible and responsive to the 
variables of the walking well.
During a bioterrorist attack the response means and locations for delivering healthcare 
should be adaptive to the demands of the event variables presented.  The delivery of 
care must expand beyond the conventional care setting, such as healthcare facility. 
During a bioterrorist attack “it is critical that the public understand that preparedness 
does not necessarily equate to availability of standard medical care during a disaster” 
(Hick, 8). Healthcare settings have a great potential to be isolated from the epicenter 
of attack.  Unconventional resources and response settings dispersed in a decentralized 
manner throughout an urban context have a greater probability to better address initial 
needs of triage, diagnosis and information dissemination. 
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The most signifi cant architectural response to bioterrorism is not redesigning existing 
healthcare facilities—they are not an ideal setting for dealing with the walking well. 
Based on resources available today, “the existing network of hospitals probably 
would not be capable of adequately caring for the people affected by a large-scale 
bioterrorist attack” (Glass, 4).  Healthcare facilities are best equipped to spatially and 
programmatically handle the demands of critical patients.  An architectural resolution 
is needed at a dispersed level throughout an urban context in order to catch and respond 
to the needs of the walking well before they present themselves at healthcare facilities, 
and inundate healthcare services needed by the critically ill.
During an event, existing emergency responders (fi re, rescue, law enforcement, and 
responding medical staff) have the ability to directly assist in treating critical and non-
critical patients.  These types of responders must communicate with the established 
network of healthcare facilities in order to provide treatment to those directly in need 
of medical assistance.  According to lessons learned during Topoff exercises, ‘to be 
effective and effi cient, response to terrorist incidents should fully utilize existing systems, 
authorities and assets’ (National Response Team, 4).  Furthermore, specialized typologies 
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of responders (such as HAZMAT and NMRT) are equipped to establish a response 
location at the epicenter of an attack providing decontamination, the distribution of 
medical resources for emergency responders to administer immunization and treatment 
to the critical patient population during an attack of bioterrorism.  A response that 
prevents the walking well from inundating healthcare facilities and response locations 
(such as the epicenter or alternative care locations) is needed to supplement existing 
response efforts so that emergency responder are capable of dealing with critical patients. 
Response typologies such as public health information, self diagnosis, and wayfi nding, 
should be distributed throughout a threat context, and be capable of activating without 
direct human assistance during an event so that the walking well are informed without 
the immediate assistance of emergency responders.
Communication of response efforts and responsibilities between healthcare facilities, 
and emergency responders should be coordinated prior to an event for a suffi cient 
response to occur during a bioterrorist attack.  This coordination will allow healthcare 
facilities and emergency responders the opportunity to be consistent and coordinated 
in their planning efforts and integrated in the manner in which they respond so that 
redundancy does not occur.
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ESTABLISHING AND IMMUNE RESPONSE MECHANISM
Biological Metaphors in Architecture
Biological references can be relevant to establishing an appropriate response system or 
network and specifi c architectural interventions.  A metaphor provides the opportunity for 
something established to be transformed and translated into an abstracted interpretation 
of the original subject.  The use of (architectural) metaphors based in science provides 
an abundant source of analogies and inspiration.  In reference to architecture and its 
relationship to modern science “is not the distance that separates the two disciplines 
but, on the contrary, a closeness that prevents free metaphoric exchanges” furthermore, 
“a productive metaphor needs an inherent distance between the terms that it links 
together—the clash in meaning being the source of resonance” (Lerner, et al., 119). 
Greater distance between the two subjects allows more room for interpretation when 
(architecturally) executing a metaphoric relationship.  For example, the process of 
applying scaffolding to a building during construction or a re-constructive process is an 
abstracted metaphorical relationship to applying a (skin) graft to a living organism—a 
biological reference to the built form.  It can be thought of as a reconstructive application 
to an existing object however it is not a literal interpretation of a scientifi c process.  A 
metaphor based in science can serve as a basis for the establishment of an architectural 
theory not necessarily by mimicking the form but the manner in which something 
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performs. For example, the systemic response of antibodies can be translated to an 
architectural response to bioterrorism.  Antibodies and architecture are not literally 
correlated and do not share a direct relationship. The manner in which antibodies 
are dispersed throughout a living being, and more importantly the way that they are 
reactive can serve as a model of systemic architectural response to bioterrorism.  The 
concept of how antibodies function should be applied to designing a dispersed response 
to bioterrorism.  This particular analogy should establish a correlation between how 
the subjects (architecture and antibodies) are reactive during an unpredictable event—
a bioterrorist attack with any particular context, or an illness or invasion within the 
immune system of a living being rather.
Establishing a metaphorical relationship is a process that abstracts something absolute 
and formulates a conceptual idea.  In this case the reactive process of antibodies is 
abstracted and translated to establish a systemic response to an event of bioterrorism 
within a physical threat context.  The reactive conditions of antibodies and responders 
to bioterrorism are similar in that they are unpredictable in size, and location.  The 
separation between their origination (science and art) and physical presence (internal 
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and external), makes establishing a metaphor between antibodies and architecture easier 
due to these differences.  Architecture is not a static condition, but a dynamic process. 
Similarly antibodies are not stagnant, they are constantly reactive.  A metaphorical 
relationship between the antibody system and architecture should be established to 
provide the basis for the development of systemic network and conceptual architectural 
interventions designed to respond to a bioterrorist attack.
Metaphor Typologies
Three typologies of metaphors exist: tangible, intangible, and a combination of the two 
typologies otherwise known as a combined metaphor.  A tangible metaphor creates a 
strong, obvious connection between the analogy and the built form or its function.  An 
intangible refers to a less evident relationship between the analogy and the product. 
Both typologies of metaphors are often executed architecturally to establish a purpose 
and meaning behind the built form--ultimately the architect materializes the relationship 
and role of the metaphor.  Despite the fact that intangible metaphors are instituted 
upon a less apparent relationship, both typologies of metaphors can provide a strong 
relationship between the analogy and the built form when executed well.  Utilizing 
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metaphors provides the opportunity to communicate additional meaning in a new 
context by translating and abstracting a known subject.  
A tangible metaphor is a literal or visual metaphor that establishes a direct correlation 
between the analogy, form and function.  For example if you build a hot dog stand, 
and adopt the form of a hotdog then people will recognize the function.  The form is 
mimetic of the function or in some instances the metaphor itself.  A successful example 
of a tangible metaphoric process is the works of Antonio Gaudi, specifi cally Casa 
Batllo in Barcelona, Spain.   Gaudi’s works were known for being organic, with strong 
references to natural forms.  His works possessed an organic language that was achieved 
by abstracting natural forms.  For example, the details of the window openings, and 
balconies were very skeletal in their appearance (Figure 36).  The Casa Batllo is a 
good example metaphoric quality, exhibiting very strong visceral, skeletal and organic 
forms.  Similarly, the details of the arched roof of the Casa Batllo were likened to the 
form of a dragon, or dinosaur (Figure 37).  The works of Antonio Gaudi possessed 
tangible metaphorical relationships to natural and organic forms and establish a direct 
correlation between the analogy and the form.
Figure 36, Casa Batllo




A tangible metaphor such as the one previously described, will not be used to establish 
a response to bioterrorism.  The proposed response locations (such as alternative care or 
existing healthcare settings) already exist within the fabric of an urban context—their 
physical envelope or form wouldn’t need to be redefi ned to be mimetic of antibodies in 
order to respond to an event of bioterrorism.  This typology is not relevant to establishing 
a response to bioterrorism.
An intangible metaphor refers to a contextual, less evident metaphor.  An intangible 
metaphor, similar to a tangible metaphor plays with the image of a form; however an 
intangible metaphor plays on the hidden, discrete meaning of the subject or object.  An 
example of this type of metaphor is the Caltrans (District 7) Headquarters designed by 
Thom Mayne and Morphosis.  Home to the California Department of Transportation, 
the primary mimetic reference of this building is that of motion and transformation. 
Located in Los Angeles, this building is referred to as a part of the fabric of the city 
as opposed to being a singular, formal object. (Figure 38)  The skin of the building is 
constantly changing.  For example metal panels mechanically open and close depending 
on outside conditions such as sunlight and temperature.  (Figure 39) Additionally, 
Figure 38, Caltrans Building
38. googlepages.com
Figure 39, Caltrans Building, Moveable Facade
39. npr.gov
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the building materials promote visceral transformation.  During the day the building 
appears to be a solid mass however during the evening the façade  transforms (because 
of lighting) and appears transparent.  Both of these systems integrated within the 
building envelope are mimetic of motion associated with the primary programmatic 
function of the building—transportation systems in an indirect manner.  The Caltrans 
building and its mimetic reference to transportation is an example of a dynamic 
intangible metaphor—the building was designed with implicit systematic references to 
transportation and doesn’t overtly mimic its subject in a static form.   
For the purpose of this thesis an intangible metaphor will be established.  An intangible 
metaphor can further be defi ned as “those in which the metaphorical departure for the 
creation is a concept, an idea, a human condition or a particular quality” (Antoniades, 
30).  An intangible metaphor will be used to establish a dynamic, systematic response 
to bioterrorism comprised of conceptual attributes that are mimetic of the antibody 
system.  This type of relationship could also be referred to as an operative metaphor used 
to establish a connection between the antibody system and a systemic and architectural 
response to bioterrorism.  A systemic response involves a series of components that 
are connected by an overall system.  Metaphorically similar to the Caltrans building 
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and its skin that is active and responsive to environmental conditions, a response to 
bioterrorism should be controlled by activated response elements such as public health 
information and self triage linked by a communication network to one or more control 
centers (based on environmental conditions).  Additionally, a response to bioterrorism 
should be active and adapt to patient fl ow—a response should not be static; it must 
capable of a reaction dependent upon patient fl ow and demand during each unique 
event.  Activation of a response to an event would be dynamic to the components 
associated with the event—type of agent used, number of people infected, and location 
of event, etc. An architectural response that looks to the antibody system is conceptually 
conceived to mimic the function of the immune system.
An analogy to antibodies is relevant to defi ning a (physical) response to bioterrorism; 
similar to a bioterrorist attack, the presentation of pathogens within the antibody system 
is unpredictable and requires an immediate form of response.  The immune system 
has components that are programmed to respond in a way that collectively provides a 
response to a pathogen.  An architectural and systemic response is made up of reactive 
components dispersed throughout an urban infrastructure, each playing a role in providing 
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a unifi ed response during an event. An architectural metaphor can be established by 
translating the role and behavior of individual components of the antibody system into 
design strategies and architectural responses.  Architecture modeled after the operative 
immune system can be more refl ective of reacting appropriately to the unpredictability 
of various bioterrorist events. Analogous to the reaction of antibodies, a systemic 
architecture is a model of emergency response capable of meeting unpredictable and 
varied demands during a bioterrorist attack.  
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Antibody System Response
Components of the antibody system are integral within the body’s overall defense 
network.  The collective ability of the entire immune system establishes the capability 
of the entire system to perform as needed during a response.  Each component has a 
role in preventing and protecting the human body against being infected.  As a whole, 
the entirety of the system operates effectively because response capabilities are highly 
dispersed throughout an established network, in this case the human body.  Architectural 
responses to an unpredictable event, such as bioterrorism should be mimetic of the 
responsive nature of the components that establish the immune system—a reactive, 
response network established with the ability to respond to unpredictable events within 
the human body.
An architectural response activated, controlled and managed at a remote location (by 
a communication network) would facilitate a  response to bioterrorism with the ability 
to be highly responsive to the fl ow of patients during an event—similar to the manner 
in which the body is capable of responding to a disruption of the immune system.  For 
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example within the human body defense mechanisms are distributed and if a particular 
area becomes infected there is a means of neutralizing the foreign object or substance 
immediately regardless of the location of infection.  A response distributed throughout 
an urban context has the potential to provide the same fl exibility of response during 
an unpredictable event—if a portion of the city is attacked, there should be immediate 
response options within the event context capable of handling infected patients.
A correlation between systemic and dispersed architectural and antibody components 
within a large and variable response network sets forth the premise for a response 
to bioterrorism to be addressed. Analogous to the coordinated and variable response 
of the immune system, two types of response mechanisms—integrated and activated 
collectively reference the biological metaphor that will be used to establish a systemic 
context for an architectural response.
In the body, the exposure of a pathogen into the antibody system can involve two 
inherently different types of response—infl ammatory (immediate recognition) or 
immune (delayed recognition).  (Figure 40)  The manner in which these different response Figure 40, Pathogenic Response40. Personal Image
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mechanisms are presented and recognized within the human body can be compared to 
the release and recognition of chemical (immediate recognition) and biological agents 
(delayed recognition) within an urban threat context.  The antibody system activates 
once it recognizes a pathogen, a foreign element that invades the immune system.  This 
is the metaphorical equivalent of a response to an event of bioterrorism within a threat 
context once an agent has been released or recognized.
In the body, an infl ammatory reaction occurs when a foreign object (such as the 
contamination associated with a traumatic wound) enters a body—there is an obvious 
disruption to the immune system.  The antibody system immediately reacts because 
the object entering the system contains (contaminated) pathogens that are easily 
recognizable.  Symptoms become apparent immediately and require medical attention 
in addition to the natural antibody response in order to address the potential severity of 
the event.
In an urban context, the release of a chemical agent and the reaction that it evokes 
is similar to an infl ammatory reaction within the antibody system.  Identifying the 
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agent employed in a chemical attack can occur immediately because its presence 
is obvious—typically chemical agents have an odor or a color and can therefore be 
recognized easily.  An immediate medical response should be delivered to victims once 
a chemical agent has been released.  Decontamination, and other necessary medical 
services administered during a response to a chemical attack is similar to the immediate 
reaction of antibodies during an infl ammatory reaction.
In the body, an immune reaction occurs when a pathogen presents itself within the 
body, yet remains unrecognized for several days.  An immune reaction progresses 
slower than an infl ammatory reaction because the pathogens enter into the system in a 
more indiscrete manner than pathogens associated with an infl ammatory reaction.  For 
example pathogens that present themselves when a cold or fl u is developing, require 
this type of response.  Not only do symptoms progress gradually, they are often more 
diffi cult to identify, however once the immune system recognizes them they begin the 
immune reactive process.
In an urban bioterrorism response system, the release of a biological agent within a 
context is similar to the presentation of a pathogen as when contracting a virus.  Like 
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pathogens of an immune response, biological agents present themselves slowly, and 
indiscreetly. An agent is released within a context and often goes unnoticed for days 
until symptoms start to present themselves within their victims. Medical services are 
administered as well as antibiotics to prevent further infection once a biological agent 
has been identifi ed.  Similarly, once an agent is identifi ed, the response network is 
activated.  It is often diffi cult to identify the source of a biological agent, when and 
where it was released.  The lack of ability to identify this type of agent is similar to a 
pathogen entering the body that requires an immune response—it is often diffi cult to 
identify the source of infection.
Components of the antibody system (in the body), and an architectural and systemic 
response to bioterrorism (within an urban context) are comprised of two basic typologies: 
those that are continuously present and provide a latent functions and those that are 
activated once a pathogen(or agent) is recognized.
In the body, continuously present elements of the immune system include lymph nodes, 
lymphocytes and macrophages (Figure 41).  Continually present components of the 
Figure 41, Continuously Present Elements
41. Personal Image
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antibody system are signifi cantly similar to healthcare facilities and alternate care 
locations. In an urban context continuously present components of an architectural 
response can be thought of as an Integrated Network—locations that are always present 
within an urban context that inherently survey the condition of (public) health.  During 
a bioterrorist attack, these components help to form the basis for a systemic response—
acting as stationary, centralized elements.  (Figure 42)
In the body, lymph nodes are stationary monitors dispersed internally throughout a 
body, close to the skin’s surface (Figure 43).  Lymph nodes monitor the status of the 
immune system determining whether or not it has been infected by a pathogen; lymph 
nodes act as a control center through which all the other components communicate 
with.  For the purpose of establishing an analogy between the immune system and 
a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of lymph nodes that will translate to a 
proposed response are the capability of monitoring the status or presence of a biological, 
or chemical agent release, as well as the ability to serve as a control center for all 
components to communicate with.
Figure 43, Lymph nodes and Lymphocytes




Like lymph nodes in the body monitoring the status of a pathogen, the (existing and 
proposed) public health network within a context should be constantly surveying for 
pathogens (such as the fl u, and viruses on a daily basis) that affect the population at large 
and would continue to monitor public health trends during an act of bioterrorism.  The 
public health network, similar to lymph nodes (after a pathogen is recognized) would 
communicate with other proposed response components (and the public) to make them 
aware of the event.  The proposed communication network that would link all types of 
responders (including healthcare facilities) together during a response effort is similar to 
the way that lymph nodes in the body act as a control center.  Also comparable to lymph 
nodes, in an urban environment the proposed communication network (along with the 
existing public health network) would have the ability to monitor the current status 
of health throughout a context.  When necessary (i.e. during an act of bioterrorism) 
the communication network would alert and activate the necessary responders, and 
response settings within the threat context; similar to lymph nodes communicating with 
the immune system when a foreign object (or pathogen) enters into the body’s system.
In the body, lymphocytes are mobile components that are constantly present and 
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dispersed throughout the body.  They communicate with lymph nodes (Figure 44) 
and react based on the demands of pathogens present in the immune system.  When 
a pathogen is recognized by lymph nodes, the lymphocytes are alerted. In order to 
contain the pathogen, lymphocytes have the responsibility to transport the pathogen 
to a macrophage, a stationary component capable of pathogen containment.  For the 
purpose of establishing an analogy between the immune system and a response to 
bioterrorism the characteristics of lymphocytes that will be utilized are the ability to 
be mobile throughout a context, the communication with lymph nodes and the reactive 
nature once a pathogen is detected.
Within an urban context lymphocytes are similar to emergency responders who have the 
capability to be mobilized such as Emergency Medical Responders, Law Enforcement, 
and Fire Departments.  Similar to lymphocytes they are distributed throughout a context 
and accountable for providing a response to an event once it has been recognized.  The 
communication network is capable of communicating with the emergency responders 
in order to activate a response in the same manner that lymph nodes communicate with 
lymphocytes once a pathogen is recognized.  Analogous to lymphocytes transporting a 
Figure 44, Lymphocytes Traverse
44. Personal Image
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pathogen to the macrophages (in order to contain the pathogen) during response effort 
EMS (ambulances, etc) act as transporters of infected patients to a stationary component 
of the healthcare network.  (Figure 45).
In the body macrophages are stationary components capable of containing a pathogen 
(once it has been recognized).  Similar to lymph nodes, macrophages are located near 
the surface of the body (Figure 46).  For the purpose of establishing an analogy between 
the immune system and a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of macrophages 
that will be utilized are the ability to be stationary (established) components capable of 
containing a pathogen (within a body).
In an urban context macrophages are similar to healthcare facilities,  stationary 
components within an urban context that are capable of surveying the condition of 
health based on the status of patients that present themselves (in particular to the 
emergency department).  Once a patient enters into a healthcare facility, treatment is 
typically administered and similar to the function of a macrophage the disease or illness 
is defeated or contained.  During a bioterrorist attack, hospitals would be utilized 





to contain critical patients, ultimately with the purpose of eradicating a disease and 
preventing further infection.  (Figure 47)
In addition to components that are constantly present, the immune system contains 
components that have the ability to be activated in response to a pathogen—antibodies 
and antigens (Figure 48).  In an urban response context activated components establish 
the vocabulary for an Activated Network – locations that are dispersed throughout an 
affected or pathogenic area, but which serve latent everyday functions until the need for 
immediate and rapid response arises once the recognition of a pathogen has occurred.
Antigens are mobile components that remain dormant until they are activated and released 
by lymph nodes during a response.  Antigens bind to the pathogen so that antibodies are 
able to recognize the pathogen.  For the purpose of establishing an analogy between the 
immune system and a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of antigens that will 
be utilized are the ability to be inactive until a response (and activation) is necessary as 
determined by the lymph nodes (or the communication network.)
Figure 47, Healthcare Facilities




In an urban environment antigens are similar to specialized forms of emergency 
response such as HAZMAT teams and NMRT.  These responders are dormant on a 
daily basis, however during an emergency situation such as a bioterrorist attack, they 
are released by an existing (emergency) communication network and typically respond 
at the epicenter—the point in which the agent (similar to a pathogen) was released or 
recognized.  (Figure 49)
In the human body antibodies are mobile components that are constantly being produced 
by our bodies in response to everyday pathogens that we come in contact with, as well 
as viruses that we have been exposed to.  Antibodies are neutralizers that deactivate a 
pathogen.  For the purpose of establishing an analogy between the immune system and 
a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of antibodies that will be utilized is their 
constant presence and ability to deactivate a pathogen.  
In an urban context antibodies (within the body) can be compared to the proposed 
supplemental care locations that are established prior to a response.  On a daily basis 
these settings such a schools, hotels, clinics, and arenas constantly perform their normal 
Figure 49, Specialized Response
49. Personal Image
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functions; however during a response to bioterrorism they are settings that can be 
converted to serve as secondary response locations primarily with the purpose to serve 
less critical patients (such as the walking well) so that the primary healthcare network 
doesn’t become unnecessarily inundated.  Unlike antigens however, these response 
resources are not mobile.  
In the body, antibodies and antigens are capable of transporting a pathogen to the 
macrophages, where ultimately the pathogen will be destroyed (Figure 50).  
In an urban context the combined function of both antibodies and antigens is similar to 
the proposed adaptation of the existing public transit network transporting patients to 
proposed and established care locations.  (Figure 51) The transportation network within 
an urban context has the ability to assist in transporting patient to healthcare facilities 
or alternative care location to receive treatment.  
Similar to the responsiveness of antibody components when a pathogen (unpredictably) 
Figure 50, Immune System Response




presents itself within the immune system, an architectural response to bioterrorism should 
also be systemic and fl exible in order to effi ciently respond to an act of bioterrorism. 
The components of the immune system are integral elements within the body’s overall 
defense network.  The function of each components assists in establishing the biological 
foundation that can help visualize and create a systematic response to bioterrorism 
that employs existing and new architectural and other health and emergency response 
resources.
This analogy to the human immune system defi nes a complete and systemic response 
to bioterrorism.  In the body when a pathogen presents itself, its size, and location 
of recognition are unpredictable however an immediate response is required.  These 
conditions are similar to the release of biological and chemical agents within a threat 
context—they type of agent used, as well as the size of the event and release location 
are unpredictable, however an immediate response is required.  The design of the 
immune system allows it to respond in multiple ways that collectively provides a 
response to a pathogen.  An architectural and systemic response should also be made 
up of reactive components dispersed throughout an urban infrastructure, each playing 
a role in providing a unifi ed response during an event.  A systemic model including 
both architectural and non-architectural resources analogous to our immune system is 
97
an ideal model of reacting appropriately to the unpredictability of various bioterrorist 
events. Analogous to the reaction and performance of antibodies when a pathogen is 
presented, a systemic approach should be better capable of meeting unpredictable and 




A response to bioterrorism must be systemic in its organization, and take into 
consideration potential resources and networks already in place within an urban context. 
Components of a response network include both activated (Figure 52) and integrated 
elements (Figure 53). Fundamental to providing a systemic response, “each (network) 
can be thought of as a potential conduit for organizing or facilitating public responses” 
(Glass, 3).  Activated elements consist of smaller proposed architectural interventions 
(such as public health information terminals, and self-triage) located within the overall 
transportation network--at transit stops within the overall transportation network or 
elements within them. These proposed interventions would have a latent function 
on a daily basis and are located externally to healthcare facilities.  These small scale 
elements include public transit nodes such as the metro rail and bus stations distributed 
throughout the context within Washington, D.C.  During an event the network control 
center  would be integrated to proposed elements (because of integrated technology) and 
would therefore have the capability of activating these response interventions within 
an urban environment; an opportunity to mitigate the walking well from healthcare 
facilities would be provided.  Activated elements dispersed throughout the extents of a 
metropolitan context establish a network of many sites for the walking well to receive 
Figure 52, Activated Elements




information that they may otherwise feel necessary to seek at a healthcare facility.  This 
will enable healthcare facilities to focus on providing healthcare to the most medically 
critical victims of a bioterrorist attack.
Integrated elements are comprised of established building typologies that can serve 
as temporary sites for the delivery of care to a large number of people.  This would 
include small scale healthcare facilities such as clinics, and ambulatory care facilities, 
but could also include hotels, convention centers, and schools—places that are capable 
of adapting spatial resources to meet the demands of lower acuity victims and the 
walking well.  For example during a natural disaster, The Red Cross assists in relief 
efforts by providing food, temporary shelter, and health services.  Similarly during a 
bioterrorist attack public health information as well as some healthcare services will 
need to be delivered in these temporary response sites specifi cally to prevent non-acute 
victims from inundating  health facilities designated for more acute care and isolation 
or containment of those actually needing these resources.
A viable response network must take into account the infrastructure of an urban context 
by utilizing elements that are easily identifi able and preferably have a widely recognized 
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civic identity in the community.  Recognizable landmarks and elements of civic 
infrastructure used as sites for information, diagnosis and minor treatment can make 
these resources more accessible to those in need.  Using existing building structure 
lessens reduces the amount of time and resources necessary to prepare a response with 
essential resources such as water and electric. During an event, “responders will have 
a limited window of opportunity to get things right” (Lasker, 2).  The more defi ned a 
response plan is, the more responsive and effective responders will be.  The purpose 
of a response network is to manage as best as possible response resources and  patient 
fl ow therefore directing potential patients to the most appropriate site for their specifi c 
needs and condition. In addition to treating the acute and emergent victims of a given 
biological or chemical event, a coordinated response must include activated resouces 
where potential victims can  receive public health information as well as minor triage 
and treatment.
During an event, several types of response resources—both activated and integrated will 
need to be extensively identifi ed and distributed throughout a threat context, allowing 




The proposed integrated response network consists of established settings such as 
healthcare facilities and alternative care locations that have the ability to treat and inform 
large numbers of victims within the Washington, D.C. metro area (Figure 54, Figure 
55).    The proposed network provides a framework where various types of resources and 
settings for care can be administered during an event. Based on the location, numbers, 
and needs of the victims during an event, components of this integrated network can 
be activated accordingly.  The most obvious elements within the integrated response 
network are healthcare facilities – including hospitals, clinics and other small facilities 
that are equipped with the necessary spatial and material resources to treat critical 
patients during this situation.
During an event, the proposed integrated response network is activated based on the 
demands of patient fl ow.  Healthcare facilities or alternative care locations area activated 
accordingly so that a suffi cient delivery of care is available as needed and dispersed 
throughout a context.  Available activated clinics and other treatment sites throughout 
impacted areas during a bioterrorism attack would provide victims with less severe 
Figure 55, Integrated Elements
55. Personal Image
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injuries the opportunity to seek care, allowing major healthcare facilities to focus on 
critical victims.  Dispersed diagnosis, triage and treatment sites throughout an urban 
context would allow victims—both real and imagined--with multiple opportunities to 
receive decentralized information and care as needed thus preventing any one facility 
from becoming inundated and not able to provide adequate care.
An integrated network cannot mitigate victims and the walking well appropriately 
without initial support provided by activated resources in the network.  During an 
event, latent self-diagnosis and information elements would be activated at a highly 
distributed level throughout the city—in particular metro and bus transit stations—
so that the general public would have many opportunities to come in contact them. 
Additional information would be available at these locations where appropriate care 
could be sought based on the degree of exposure.  These elements would also provide 
wayfi nding and information about alternative care locations and healthcare facilities 
so that the system could direct victims to appropriate care locations throughout the 
integrated network based on their self diagnosis.
103
Figure 54, Integrated Response Locations within Washington D.C.
54. Personal Image
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Healthcare Facilities: The backbone of any integrated response network are existing 
healthcare facilities—including hospitals, clinics and other small facilities that are 
already equipped and established spatially and materially to provide a comprehensive 
medical response (Figure 56, 57).  Based on simulation modeling of patient fl ow 
during an event, those patients in critical need of care would be directed to established 
healthcare facilities.  In order to fully determine whether or not Washington D.C. is 
capable of handling the potential infl ux of victims from various scenarios an analysis 
of existing bed capacity and average availability must be understood.
Based on an informal assessment of existing healthcare facilities within Washington, 
D.C. it was assumed that no additional hospital-based facilities will be needed to 
supplement existing bed capacity.  Existing healthcare facilities are adequately 
equipped, programmed and sized to handle the demands of critical victims as currently 
distributed throughout the entire urban context during an attack of bioterrorism. This 
assessment is based on the proposition that non-critical patients will be served outside 
of hospitals at established alternative care locations, and that the walking well will be 
mitigated through the activation of information interjections at transit nodes.
Figure 56, Healthcare Facility Network
56. Personal Image
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Figure 57, Existing Resource Capability Healthcare Network































(3) Providence Hospital 330 247
[83]
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(9) Medlink Hospital 23 N/A N/A
(10) D.C. General Hospital 150 97
[53]
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Facilities located in Washington, D.C. are capable of handling the predicted 
critical patient load during a bioterrorist attack.
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Alternative Care Locations: The secondary response sites of the proposed integrated 
network include locations such as schools, arenas, convention centers, and hotels.  These 
sites must already be pre-equipped with spatial and strategic resources (such as water 
and electricity) and have the ability to be converted to handle the needs of potentially 
large numbers of non-critical patients (Figure 54).   During an attack, presumably fear 
and panic will result in part because people are unfamiliar with this type of event; people 
will fl ood major transportation arteries in an effort to evacuate the city, as well as known 
healthcare settings in an effort to receive treatment that they might not need.  Providing 
and directing people to additional activated response sites within urban infrastructures 
disperses opportunities for non-critical and the walking well to be diagnosed outside of 
centralized (conventional) healthcare facilities.  These sites can help alleviate the load 
placed on healthcare facilities. An abundant number of potential treatment locations 
capable of responding can help re-assure the public that they will be able to receive 
care.  Panic can be better addressed through a systemic and widely dispersed response 
at alternative care locations.  The alleviation of fear can be made possible through the 
implementation of “a broad array of places—work sites, shops, malls, schools, day care 
centers, hospitals, clinics, cultural institutions, recreational and entertainment facilities, 
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government buildings, apartment buildings, and transportation terminals—serving as 
safe havens”  (Lasker, 5).
Alternative Care Typologies: All alternative care typologies must have adequate 
plumbing, electricity (assuming no power outages have occurred) and shelter for the 
potentially large number of potential victims predicted based on simulation modeling 
prior to an event.
Hotels: Given that they are already equipped with bedrooms and beds, hotels have the 
opportunity to provide intermediate care when hospitals are at capacity (Figure 58).  A 
hotel would not serve as an immediate lower intensity inpatient point of care to non-
critical patients; however patients who are in need of observation but not in critical 
condition could be transported to a converted hotel rather than hospital.
 Educational Facilities: Schools are typically designated and equipped to provide 
shelter for large numbers of potential victims during a wise variety of disaster response 
scenarios (Figure 59).  For example, a cafeteria, gymnasium or auditorium has the 
Figure 58, Washington D.C. Hotels




ability to provide a place of refuge for potential victims.  Classrooms can provide 
smaller treatment areas allowing patients to be dispersed based on their level of need. 
The existing structure and organization of a school alleviates the need for responders to 
erect and establish temporary settings that otherwise would need to be provided.
Recreational and Entertainment Facilities:  These settings such as indoor stadiums, 
arenas, etc are advantageous because they are designed to handle the fl ow of large 
numbers of people (Figure 60).  Multiple points of entry provide the ability for many 
potential patients to be provided with shelter and care more immediately.  Assuming 
that screening and triage capabilities were stationed at each point of entry, arriving 
victims could be directed to either further care or refuge.  The biggest advantage to this 
type of building typology is the ability to house such an immense number of potential 
victims.
The predicted number of non-critical patients will be greater than critical patients that 
result during a bioterrorist attack.  Similar to the response of the Red Cross during a 
natural disaster or other mass casualty situation, these alternative locations would be 




served and equipped by disaster relief medical staff and other public health offi cials 
and volunteers.  During natural disasters, the Red Cross is capable of responding 
with necessary medical supplies and staffi ng.  Typically, this type of response takes 
place within existing infrastructure such as schools, stadiums or arenas.  The proposed 
integrated network would be capable of activating in a similar manner—utilizing local 
staff and medical stockpiles.
Prior to an event, appropriate alternative care locations would be identifi ed by a local 
jurisdiction; during an event, based on the location of an event epicenter and probable/
actual victim fl ow, a variety of screening and treatment sites would be activated to serve 
non-critical patients and the walking well.  Identifying these resources includes assessing 
spatial capabilities, as well as an estimating capacity level.  Alternative care locations 
also must be sought out based on other basic programmatic functions—providing 
kitchens, bathrooms, and large waiting areas.  In order to understand a generalized load 
capacity, building footprints were analyzed in the District of Columbia.  The larger the 
footprint, generally the greater potential to handle a considerable patient load.   Prior 
to an event square footage and capacity of probable alternative care locations would be 
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assessed by planning offi cials (and documented) to a greater degree.  It is understood 
that “large spaces, such as cafeterias, or auditoriums can be used for observation of 
large numbers of patients with minor or not apparent injuries” (Macintyre, 146).  The 
care delivered at alternative care locations would be less (medically) demanding and 
would be limited to non-invasive procedures such as the administering of immunization 
during an instance of bioterrorism.  These alternative care locations would require no 
additional architectural modifi cations but would however require a supplement of 
medical resources and supplies.  Most emergency response units are equipped with 
a stockpile of these resources to be utilized during similar situations in which care 
must be administered outside of a healthcare facility.  During an event, not only would 
emergency responders staff a location, but medical supplies would be delivered to each 
alternative care location based on the type of care predicted to be needed.
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Activated Network
During an event, a wide variety of potential response sites will be activated based on 
the relationship to the epicenter as well as the proximity to the greatest demand of 
victims.  The number of responding locations would depend on the size, nature and 
impact of the actual attack.  During a chemical attack it is predicted that a  greater 
number of walking well will be generated within a closer proximity to the epicenter, 
therefore more alternative care locations will need to be activated to meet the demands 
of these potential victims; fewer locations would need to be activated further from the 
epicenter.  Given the likelihood of an immediate recognition of the agent released, a 
response location would typically be established by hazmat teams at the immediate 
epicenter.  
The release of a biological agent would demand a response  that is dispersed throughout 
a context (at alternative care settings) due to the delay of recognition; a higher number 
of walking well are likely to present themselves across a much larger geographical area 
during this type of response because of the fl u-like symptoms typical of biological agents. 
During either a chemical or biological event, dispersed architectural interventions that 
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convey event related public health information would be necessary to alleviate fear and 
panic throughout the potential victim population.  Despite the type of agent released 
it can be assumed that the larger the epicenter, the more victims and walking well are 
predicted to be generated.
Staffi ng during an event would be based on available local medical staff not only including 
those within healthcare facilities, but (health department) public health employees.  The 
activation of this temporary healthcare setting would require transportation of supplies 
to the alternative care locations—this can be performed by local emergency responders 
such as fi re and other emergency responders.  It can be assumed that ambulances will 
be consumed with transporting critical victims from the epicenter to the healthcare 
facilities, however other emergency response vehicles could be utilized to transport 
medical supplies from local stockpiles to alternative care locations.  The network 
should only be activated to the degree needed to meet the demand and scope of patient 
typology and fl ow.
Services provided would include immunization and acute care services.  For example 
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during a chemical attack or an event where trauma might occur during an explosion—
victims needing only the dressing of minor wounds and abrasions would be treated at 
alternative care locations rather than at hospitals.  Critical patients who may be in need 
of more invasive attention would be transferred to healthcare facilities where more acute 
services could be offered.  Psychological services as well as public health information 
would be included at alternative care locations such as educational facilities, hotels, 
and recreational venues in order to better serve the walking well who would be directed 
to alternative care locations.
Post-event it is signifi cant to restore activated alternative care locations to their prior 
use as promptly as possible once all care is rendered.  Doing so provides the public with 
reassurance that life has returned to normal conditions.  Educational facilities, hotels, 
and recreational venues should not be activated unnecessarily; they should only be 
activated when the demand of non-critical patients has the potential to quickly inundate 
the healthcare system.  Post-event clean-up and sanitation must occur before a location 
can return to its normal function as quickly as possible.  After containment and on-site 
treatment of victims has been completed following a chemical event, it is important 
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that the surrounding context of the epicenter be decontaminated so that any residual 
remainders of a chemical agent are removed from the exposed environment.  This 
clean-up and restoration must take place to minimize environmental risk to people that 
live, work or need to move through the immediate area and in part to reassure the public 
that the subsequent return to normal use of these settings does not pose a health threat. 
It alleviates an element of fear and stigma associated with and event.
Potential victims, including the walking well would be made aware of all activated 
locations for care during an event through the placement of digital information displays 
at critical transit nodes and pathways including but not limited to Metro stations and 
highway message boards.  These displays would convey public health information as 
well as media coverage of the movement of people within the city.  Given access to 
accurate information on the event and where to seek appropriate help, potential victims 
would be more likely to seek care at the most appropriate accessible locations rather 
than inundating hospitals.  Didactic interjections would also be visible at activated 
care sites prior to an event, similar to public service notices indicating the location of 
a bomb shelter. Therefore an appropriate awareness of a possible response sites can be 
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made more apparent.  If the general public is visually made aware of response elements 
and sites on a regular basis (prior to an event), then during an event they will have a 
general understanding of where to seek care.
During an event an urban-wide response is proposed through the activation of 
architectural interventions such as public health information terminals, thermal scans 
and self-triage kiosks and wayfi nding features located within the public mass transit 
networks such as the metro system stations and bus stops. (Figure 61)  These sites are 
located throughout the context Washington DC.  The purpose of these activated sites 
and elements in the response network is to direct victims to appropriate care at many 
locations throughout the urban context before they seek care at, and inundate, acute 
healthcare facilities.  Public health information displays and terminals would provide a 
cohesive information across the entire response network; information conveyed to the 
public would remain consistent and controlled by a single, response network control 
center .  Activated elements such as thermal scans or self-triage kiosks within metro 
stations would function independently of each other; they are based on the immediate 
individual interaction of the general public including  potential victims.  The activation 




of wayfi nding elements at the street level would be dependent upon the activation of 
response sites surrounding the metro system.  Wayfi nding would only be activated 
if alternative care locations were functioning as care settings—the activation of care 
settings would be dependent upon patient fl ow generated by the response to self-triage. 
All proposed response elements would be connected to the network control center so 
that an overall picture of the evolving event impact can be understood and responded 
to appropriately.
A series of public health information terminals within the transit network would be 
designed and located to help disseminate public health information, and enable real and 
perceived victims to perform self-diagnosis through a series of health related questions. 
Self diagnosis could be accomplished through either small-scale architectural kiosks or 
by calling into a dedicated telephone system and answering a series of teleprompted 
questions.  The series of questions would be designed to assess the patients current 
condition and determine the degree of care in which potential victims most likely need 
to receive.  In addition to providing self-triage, this response can direct victims to 
appropriate location for care—a healthcare facility or an alternative care site.  These 
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programmatic functions providing information, self triage and wayfi nding can work 
effectively to serve a large number of potential victims due to the way in which 
transit networks are dispersed within an urban context, as well as their iconographic 
representation.  Metro stations are generally known landmarks and nodes for residents, 
commuters and most of the people who live, work and move through an urban context. 
Through this didatic presence there is a greater potential for the walking well to have 
early access to front line information, diagnosis and referral.  These elements may be 
used by any potential ambulatory victim, but will ultimately be able to meet the most 
immediate and appropriate needs of the walking well.  Most victims however, won’t 
know whether they are contaminated and need treatment or not until they engage the 
proposed diagnostic station elements.  
Each component of the overall response network has its own responsibility and role, 
yet interconnects with the other as a part of the systemic response to bioterrorism. 
Activated elements, including both widely distributed diagnosis-information-referral 
sites and secondary treatment sites, together with established healthcare and emergency 
response elements are combined to form an integrated network.  Activated resources are 
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designed to be the fi rst point of contact with potential victims due to the high number 
of dispersed locations.
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Figure 62, Washington D.C. Metro System Transportation Network
62. Personal Image
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Transportation Network: Mass transit systems are not only utilized daily by many 
potential victims but are also capable of transporting victims, both critical and non 
critical, to locations to receive care.  It is plausible to assume that the use of “untraditional 
forms of transport may be needed because EMS assets will be challenged to meet the 
needs of the disaster” (Hick, 8).  Urban transit systems, including metro rail systems, 
bus routes and the network of streets, will be used as principal components of the 
activated network.  Bus or metro trains can be used to alleviate the predicted transport 
demand that will be placed on existing emergency resources, such as ambulances 
and other emergency vehicles.  During an emergency response public transportation 
systems could be dedicated as patient transporters, no architectural intervention or 
physical change would be necessary.  Rail mass transit systems are viable response 
models because they are scalable to the demands of patient fl ow —more trains can 
be added, or the direction of a line can change based on the location of event and care 
sites.  Similarly, bus systems offer the same capability of being altered to meet the 
demands of patient fl ow however, they are much more fl exible and less vulnerable to 
disruption than the rail systems.  The nodes at which metro lines, bus routes, and street 
systems intersect establishes a series of potential transfer, control and potential triage 
Figure 63, Metro System
63. wmata.gov
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sites where potential victims can be sorted and transported as needed either by non-
traditional or traditional modes of emergency response throughout an urban context. 
(Figure 62)
In Washington DC, the Metro not only serves the district proper but also extends into 
Maryland, and Virginia—therefore expanding the limits and scope of the potential 
response network (Figure 63).  On average, the Metro carries 190 million people per 
year and provides the ability to commute to 41% of people working within the city 
(wmata.com).  The fact that so many commuters rely on the metro on a daily basis 
establishes that the metro will be capable of acting as a ‘net’ during an event. If an 
event were to take place during a weekday, it can be assumed that while evacuating the 
city, a large percentage of commuters will come in contact with the metro—either the 
train or a bus.  Therefore the transit system has the great potential to provide sites for 
disseminating information, serving as self diagnosis sites and redirecting the public as 







Figure 64, Washington D.C. Civic Nodes and Landmarks
64. Personal Image
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Understanding that the mass transit systems are potential targets means that commuters 
within a targeted metro station would immediately be evacuated and treated at the 
street level in the event of an attack on a station or line.  The metro would obviously 
no longer be able to serve as a means of transport during this type of event.  In that 
situation the city bus network would be activated to transport non-critical and critical 
patients to healthcare facilities and alternative care locations.  The bus system would 
also need to be re-confi gured to run routes that serve metro stops.  Given the number 
of people who do not utilize mass transit – emergency vehicles must also become a 
part of the Activated Network.  Commuters within their personal vehicles would be 
informed through digital street and highway signage and directed towards emergency 
response sites and resources along their route.  Vehicular commuters could also phone 
into a dedicated system that allows them to self diagnose through an automated system. 
Utilizing all transportation networks within an urban context greatly increases the 
number of potential victims receiving public health information, or self-diagnosis 
through the distribution of activated elements during an event.
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Nodes and Landmarks: In order to strengthen didactic awareness during an event, 
activated elements must take into consideration that a wide variety of civic nodes and 
landmarks possess a vital iconographic representation throughout an urban context. 
(Figure 64)
Transit nodes are established through the intersection of metro stations, bus routes, and 
the street grid, providing the greatest potential for reaching and transporting all types 
of potential victims, including both critical victims and the walking well (Figure 59). 
The mode of transportation utilized by each category of victim would be established 
particular to each event, the patient load, and the activated alternative care networks. 
Through planning and utilizing all modes of public transportation during an event, a 
fl exible approach to response is established by providing various response options. 
For example, if the metro rail were to be targeted during an event, other options for 
transferring patients are in place.  Response sites are identifi ed by existing signage 
demarcating the entrance to a metro station, as well as a bus stop signage.
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Within densely populated and heavily visited tourist areas some nodes and landmarks 
of iconographic representation may be unfamiliar to the visitor.  Activated elements 
must be easily identifi ed ‘points of attraction’ that a ‘tourist’ would recognize.  These 
locations are signifi cant not only because of their didactic presence, but because of 
the density of population that they typically encompass.  Similar types of response, 
including self-diagnosis and public health information would be conveyed at highly 
legible landmarks throughout an urban context.
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Design Criteria
The activated intervention selected for architectural study and development includes 
kiosks for public health information, self-diagnosis, and wayfi nding.  For a response to 
be implemented comprehensively based on the fact that bioterrorism is a low probability, 
hard to predict event design interventions dispersed throughout the city must have a 
latent everyday purpose in addition to an activated response after a bioterrorist attack. 
The basis for each designed interventions includes the following attributes: integrated 
technology, didactic representation, and the ability to provide a dynamic response. 
Each type of architectural interjection must be relatively low cost, widely dispersed, 
and have multiple latent and activated functions because the nature of bioterrorism 
means that an architectural or systemic response may be rarely or never actually needed 
in any given location.
Bioterrorism response sites must not only be minimum cost but also require nominal 
to no maintenance—preferably having a long shelf-life so that more locations can be 
widely dispersed and replicated through a threat context.  A long shelf life reinforces 
the ability of a response to occur effectively regardless of the time that it remained un-
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activated.
Integrated Technology:  Integrated technology is the ability to provide a continuous 
and dynamic response to patient fl ow during a bioterrorist event with minimal human 
resources.  Patient fl ow during an event will be fl uid and unpredictable, design 
interventions have to be immediately reactive to this demand so that healthcare 
facilities do not become inundated with walking well.  A response to bioterrorism 
should therefore have the ability to activate instantaneously and not be hindered by 
the inability of emergency responders (already at high demand) to deploy design 
interventions throughout an urban context.
Integrated technology is a covert component of the design criteria for a response to 
bioterrorism that occurs within the activated network and serves as a link between the 
programmatic responses—public health information, self diagnosis, and wayfi nding. 
Integrated technology focuses on providing constant communication and information 
to the public during an event; emergency responders are alleviated of the task of 
directing or delivering information and services to potential victims at many sites 
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during a response.
The activation of information-diagnosis-treatment sites linked through integrated 
technology during an event of bioterrorism is similar to airbags deploying within a 
vehicle (Figure 65).  Multiple sensors, the controller and the airbags themselves form an 
integrated system that detects sudden changes in the state of a vehicle, including rapid 
deceleration and extreme physical changes.  When conditional changes are detected the 
airbag is deployed automatically in order to provide a form of protection to the vehicles 
occupants. In a bioterrorism response system all interventions should be linked through 
integrated technology to an emergency control center.  Once an event occurs and is 
identifi ed by emergency responders the public must be provided with public health 
information, and sources of self-diagnosis and wayfi nding.  The emergency control 
center, located outside of the immediate urban context to reduce the risk of becoming 
a target of attack, would have the immediate ability to activate and/or deploy the 
necessary response interventions throughout an urban context.  As the dynamics of an 
event change the control center would adjust the information conveyed to the public, as 
well as the number and location of activated design interventions.
Figure 65, Deploying Airbags
65. google.com
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Dynamic Responsiveness: Dynamic responsiveness is the ability for a designed 
intervention to react to the unpredictability of a bioterrorist event—specifi cally 
potential patient fl ow.  Bioterrorism is unpredictable in nature; design interventions 
such as public health information, self-diagnosis and way fi nding, as well as alternative 
care locations need to be capable of activating in many ways.  (Figure 66)
Dynamic responsiveness accommodates the need for various response models to occur 
based on the typology of an event; commercial aircraft are similar in that their emergency 
response features accounts for various types reactions to potential events.  Planes are 
equipped with oxygen masks activated through a type of integrated technology that is 
controlled by a hierarchical network once conditional changes are detected.  Likewise 
interventions dispersed throughout an urban context must be capable of activation 
without direct human response at the immediate deployment or activation location. 
Proposed design interventions would be connected to a command and control center 
through integrated technological devices and software.  For example, human resources 
at a remote communication center would be able to activate responses through the use 
of software connected to individual elements within the transit network.
Figure 66, Dynamic Responsiveness
66. google.com
130
During an event a command and control center, comprised of various typologies of 
emergency responders, and medical professionals, would determine what dispersed 
elements would need to be activated based on the monitoring and dispersion of the agent 
and patient fl ow.  For example during a chemical event it is immediately and physically 
evident where the agent has been dispersed and what the potential patient fl ow may 
entail—based on this information the control center would be able to determine where 
response components need to be activated.  
During a biological event because of the delay in recognition the network control center 
would need to monitor patient demand and activate a response based on patient fl ow 
until more details are determined about the exact location of release.  The network 
control center would be located remotely from the threat context, and would be both 
human, and computer-based.  This center would be the main location for all typologies 
of responders to collect and disperse information pertinent to an event.  In other words 
a widespread response may be necessary until details are established regarding the size 
and scope of a biological release.  Once it has been determined where a biological agent 
was released then potentially exposed victims can be informed by the command and 
control center.
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Another response analogy to be found in commercial aircraft are the fl otation devices 
located under each passengers seat and emergency door (evacuation) slides.  In the 
event of a survivable emergency event passengers would deploy their own device—
direct human interaction is immediately needed for a response to be deployed.  This 
type of response is analogous to the network of alternative care sites.  Alternative care 
locations, such as hotels, schools, and arenas cannot serve as care locations without 
being activated and the direct response and assistance offered by emergency responders. 
Potential victim fl ow during a response to an event will be unpredictable in terms of 
the type of care and degree of assistance that will need to be provided.  Dynamic 
responsiveness is provided by the reactive nature of both designed interventions and 
the alternative care network during an act of bioterrorism.
Didactic Awareness: Didactic awareness is the ability for a designed intervention to 
convey a cognitive awareness of response locations prior to an event.  In an effort to 
alleviate panic, response efforts will be established at activated alternative care locations 
and nodes throughout an urban context external to healthcare facilities.  During an 
event, an activated diagnosis, treatment and information sites located at recognizable 
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locations must be something that the public can locate and recognize.
The low probability, high consequence nature of bioterrorism implies that fear and 
panic will presumably result during an event.  During the Cold War, fallout shelter 
signs (Figure 67) were employed to designate the location of shelters that had been 
identifi ed, surveyed and pre-supplied to supposedly safe havens in the event of a 
nuclear attack.  During any type of terrorist attack panic will be evident, however past 
episodic events indicate an overall sense of cooperation from the public.  It is believed 
that “social chaos does not occur in disaster situations because people tend to respond 
in accordance with their customary norms and roles” (Glass, 3).  During the cold war, 
shelter signs created a didactic awareness among the general public, and ultimately 
established an association with a place of safety.  The uncertainty of what to and where 
to go can be alleviated if the presence of a response is established on a daily basis (prior 
to an event) in order to provide the public with further information regarding response 
strategies.
Another example of didactic awareness can be seen in fi re alarm pull stations present 
Figure 67, Fallout Shelter Sign
67. google.com
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throughout public buildings. (Figure 68)  There is a cognitive awareness of their 
presence and the response that they will provide during an emergency situation. 
During a response to an attack of bioterrorism, design interventions providing public 
health information, self-diagnosis, and wayfi nding need to be deployed throughout an 
urban context.  Similar to fi re alarms, it is necessary for the public to understand their 
response and location during an event.  Didactic awareness should be built into any 
fi xed response location including components of the activated and integrated network.
Figure 68, Fire Alarm
68. google.com
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DEFINING A RESPONSIVE PROGRAM
Program Components
The programmatic focus of this thesis proposal is on infrastructure elements dispersed 
throughout a threat context and designed to intercept, diagnose and redirect the walking 
well away from emergency departments and acute care hospitals.  This thesis assumes 
that existing acute and critical care healthcare facilities can adequately handle the care 
of critical victims—therefore proposed program components do not need to include 
functions for critical victims that will presumably exist.  It also assumes that non-critical 
victims will be treated at nearby schools, hotels, and other alternative care locations 
with suffi cient spatial allocations as needed for an event.  In some instances mobile 
resources such as EMS and HAZMAT teams will be deployed to some of these sites 
to compliment latent facilities and resources already in play.  It can be understood that 
external supplies will be provided by pre-positioned and dispersed stockpiles, such as 
those established by the National Metropolitan Response Team (NMRT), or the Centers 
for Disease Control.  When establishing the response program components, healthcare 
facilities and alternative care locations need no further architectural attention beyond 
existing spatial and resource allocations.
Each designed element proposed within the response program has two types of 
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functions—latent and activated.  Public health information would be made available 
during both normal day-to-day use and during/after a bioterrorism event, however the 
information conveyed would be pertinent to the status of the event and direct people 
how to react.  Metro ticketing terminals will latently serve in their normal capacity for 
riders, when activated they will have the potential to be converted into self diagnosis 
stations, providing potential victims with the opportunity to triage themselves. 
Conditional wayfi nding elements and signage located at the street level would have the 
ability to be digitally converted during an attack and have the capability to direct non-
critical victims to a dispersed alternative care locations.  All three program responses 
are interconnected to a network control center and event management centers through 
integrated information technology.
Network control center: A network control center establishes a non-architectural 
connection between designed interventions and emergency responders.  The existing 
and proposed network control center must provide information and continuity between 
dispersed program/system elements during the entire timeline of a bioterrorist event. 
Components must be interconnected through the use of technology to the network 
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control center so that an appropriate response is based on specifi c event typology and 
patient fl ow.  Technology integrated within each program response enables responders 
the ability to monitor event impacts and patterns of infection/contamination and relay 
immediate, up to date information to all elements in the system during an event.
Most healthcare facilities currently have a designated emergency response center. 
Typically these response centers have an established connection to external emergency 
responders, such as EMS responders as well as fi re and other types of local response 
units.  The intent of a control center within a healthcare facility however is to provide 
consistent, ongoing response and monitoring of onsite resources during an emergency 
situation.  Therefore each healthcare facility currently functions as an isolated entity 
throughout an urban context and does not comprehensively take into consideration 
response efforts being made at other potentially impacted facilities.  Multiple hospitals 
functioning as an individual emergency responder creates the potential for redundancy 
of resources, lack of coordination and a less effective response during an urban wide 
event.
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This thesis assumes a proposed communication and coordination network that would 
include a centralized response center (determined prior to an event) outside of the threat 
context that would coordinate all emergency responders, public offi cials, representatives 
from healthcare facilities and medical staff collectively so that they have the ability 
to act as a single entity.  The intent of a central response location is to provide and 
monitor a distributed response based on resources and patient fl ow throughout an entire 
urban context.  The specifi c location of a centralized response center would be based 
on the size of an urban context and available resources located outside of a particular 
threat context.  A centralized response center does not necessarily need to be designated 
within a healthcare facility, but rather could be located in an alternative care location. 
Within the context of Washington DC, federal representation and authority would take 
precedent due to the potential threat targets such as the White House, Capital, and other 
major Federal Institutions.  Despite the role of the federal jurisdiction, local responders 
would play a key role in providing care during a bioterrorist attack.  All responders 
within the coordinated network would monitor the situation, provide status reports and 
receive coordinated directives thus determining the type of response needed and where 
it needs to take place.
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A control center would be staffed by representatives of each organization and 
jurisdiction in the response network therefore establishing a sense of continuity during 
a response.  In addition to conventional medical staff and emergency responders, other 
representation would include public health offi cial and media responders who would 
be present within the control center.  “Hospitals would need to communicate with and 
receive support from a wide variety of organizations, including other hospitals and 
local, state and federal health offi cials, as well as emergency management and public 
safety agencies”  (Inglesby, 443).  The proposed control center and network control 
center would be activated immediately, so that critical decisions would be made as to 
what programmatic elements would be activated as necessary, and information would 
be conveyed to the public to respond accordingly and alleviate panic.
Panic and confusion can be minimized by providing consistent and accurate information 
to the public during a disaster.  During an event “the release of inaccurate, confusing 
or contradictory information by leaders and/or the media has the potential to increase 
levels of fear, panic and demoralization as well as to discredit authorities” (Glass, 
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4).  Typically during any type of episodic event media representation can not always 
be considered as a complete and accurate representation of the actual situation.  The 
media has the opportunity to play a major role in notifying the public appropriately 
during a bioterrorist event if media sources are directly a part of the central response 
center.  They would be informed immediately by authorities within the response center 
and would serve as one information conduit for the control center, directly informing 
the public.  It is essential that the central response center establish “a close working 
relationship between (the media), decision makers and those involved in response 
operations” (Glass, 5).  Due to the mobile nature of occupants within an urban threat 
context, widespread access to health related information beyond the capability of 
existing system notifi cation elements within the transportation network is necessary in 
order to provide the most opportunities for potential victims to gain information about 
a bioterrorist attack outside of the immediate urban threat context.
Public Health Information Display Elements: Multiple types of information should be 
conveyed to the general public throughout the (urban) threat context—“healthcare staff 
should provide information on the agent involved, potential short- and long- term effects, 
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recommended treatment, stress reactions, and possible avenues to further assistance” 
(Macintyre, 246). Public health display elements would provide information both 
preceding, during and post- event.  (Figure 69)
Public advisory display elements would be located throughout an urban context—
specifi cally within the transit network, streets, highways and other movement pathways. 
Display elements would be integrated within buses and bus shelters (street level) as 
well as on trains and metro stations (below grade).  These display elements would 
be operated on both an activated and latent basis and would therefore not only be 
used during an event.  Currently within the metro system there are display panels at 
the train platform informing the public of arrivals and system information.  (Figure 
70) These elements are controlled through the use of technology at a single location. 
Similarly, public health displays would be technologically integrated to the network 
control center.  The health content displayed on a latent basis would be decided upon 
by a public health representative. Display panels could also be individualized allowing 
information to be tailored to the needs of a particular area.  For example panels near the 
event epicenter would need more specifi c information during a response compared to 
Figure 69, Display Element
Figure 70, Metro Display Panel
70.  Personal Image
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information displayed further away from the epicenter that may only give an alert that 
an event has occurred.
Non-event public health information would provide information useful to the target 
population, or cover current health trends.  During fl u season for example, public health 
information could provide users with information as to where to receive a fl u shot. 
Similarly, within the District of Columbia the potential opportunity for a bioterrorist 
attack is measured by a threat level indicator (dictated by the Department of Homeland 
Security).  Once the threat level reaches a high threat indication the display element 
would convey security measures that the public need to take, or be aware of.
Activated public health display elements during an event would provide potential 
and actual victims with the opportunity to receive information pertinent to the type 
of incident that has occurred (i.e. what symptoms occur when a patient has been 
exposed to anthrax, or how is an agent spread from person to person).  Emergency 
response representatives within the network control center would collectively decide 
what information should be conveyed to the public.  More signifi cant is the fact that 
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information could change instantaneously based on the status and impact of an event.
A network comprised of “systems and protocols for communicating timely and accurate 
information to the public are critical during crisis or emergency situations” (NIMS, 
28).  Providing information to the public establishes a sense of control at the victim 
level during what may seem like an uncontrollable event.  Similarly, health information 
conveyed at a dispersed level would provide the walking well with the information they 
would otherwise seek from healthcare offi cials and facilities.
Independent-Triage: The general public should have the ability to independently 
perform an initial form of self triage during an event response.  Potential victims will 
want to seek immediate answers as to whether or not they are infected.  The impact of the 
walking well can be tempered through a series of opportunities for independent triage 
(including thermal scans and self-diagnosis kiosks) dispersed throughout a network 
of mass transit stations and nodes.  Establishing independent triage sites throughout 
a context will assist in coping with the potentially widespread impact of a bioterrorist 
event.
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Washington D.C. is in the process of implementing an automated independent triage 
system through an electronic assessment either via phone or internet.  This system 
is comprised of a series of ‘yes/no’ questions specifi c to the symptoms that a victim 
may be experiencing due to the exposure to any type of bioterrorist agent.  When 
performing a individual assessment “after the computer leads someone through the 
questions, either online or over the telephone, the patient would be advised according 
to what the symptoms seem to be.  The options the system might offer include: stay 
at home in voluntary quarantine, go to a designated site for follow-up care, move to 
an isolation facility or just relax” (Goldstein, 1).  During a time in which medical staff 
will be at high demand, this type of system provides a greater sense of security to the 
walking well because they are able to receive an answer much more immediately than 
otherwise possible.  An electronic self triage system is a viable means of providing 
triage extraneous to a healthcare facility without direct assistance from medical staff. 
This system is a comprehensible and practical means of response, however it only 
targets individuals with access to a phone, or the internet—those who don’t have that 
access to these amenities need to also be served.
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Potential victims who do not have access to either a phone or the internet can be served 
through the dispersion of independent triage stations throughout a threat context.  The 
number of triage stations needed to provide an opportunity for individual triage can 
be based on the average number of people typically present on a daily basis within 
a given context that may not have access to a phone, or the internet.  There are two 
types of independent triage that are technologically available and can be implemented 
extraneous to the telephone/internet method of diagnosis – thermal scans (Figure 71), 
and self-diagnosis kiosks.  Thermal scans provide a quick generalized diagnosis that 
ultimately serves as a fi lter, sorting the actual victims from the walking well.  Although 
a slower response, self-diagnosis stations would supplement thermal scans and would 
provide a more detailed level of assessment.  These kiosks could be located at a wide 
variety of locations throughout an urban threat context including transit nodes, gas 
stations, rest stops, etc.
The process of individual triage through the use of thermal scans involves checking a 
basic vital sign—in this case body temperature.  Thermals scans operate in a manner that 
Figure 71, Thermochromic Material
71.  google.com
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once a user comes in contact (by touch of the hand) with the thermochromic material, 
the surface (after a few seconds) will change color based on the temperature of the 
user’s body.  A common side effect for patients who have come in contact with predicted 
types of biological or chemical agents, is elevated body temperature.  Thermocromic 
surfaces can be regulated to be reactive only to temperatures that would classify as a 
fever.  A user will visually receive either a positive or a negative reaction.  (Figure 72) 
Coding could be printed onto the thermochromic surface explaining the translation of 
color and temperature range.  The surface would also display additional instructions 
similar to the telephone/internet responses.  If in fact they have a fever, they would be 
directed to a nearby self-diagnosis station typically located within a close proximity to 
a thermal scanner.
It is proposed that within proximity to thermal scans, (latent) ticket vending terminals 
within a metro station would be activated during an event, and converted into self-
diagnosis stations. (Figure 73)  Prior to an event, software would be implemented 
into the terminals to provide the necessary response during an event.  When using a 
self-diagnosis terminal, the user would also be thoroughly questioned about the state 
Figure 72, Thermochromic Display Element
Figure 73, Ticketing Vending Terminals
72.  google.com
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of their health, similar to typical questions asked by a triage nurse at a healthcare 
facility.  Ultimately a form of electronic assessment “would ease pressure on hospitals” 
(Goldstein, 2).  The self diagnosis process would also act as a means of collecting 
public health information—particularly patient information and tracking, allowing 
responding authorities to survey the pattern of disease and victim fl ow.
Wayfi nding Elements: Wayfi nding elements (Figure 74) must be provided to help 
people navigate to healthcare settings such as hospitals and activated alternative care 
locations once they have received the results of an individual triage assessment.  These 
elements will be integrated or attached to existing infrastructure elements in the urban 
fabric such as light poles, traffi c signals, electronic highway advisory signs, billboards, 
transit signs, etc.  The wayfi nding system targets all users, but in particular those who 
may be unfamiliar with appropriate care locations.  Potential victims unfamiliar with 
their environment may be less likely to successfully fi nd alternative care locations 
compared to local residents.  In addition, wayfi nding as a response program component 
can help alleviate fear and panic by reassuring potential victims of their ability to locate 
appropriate care settings.
Figure 74, Wayfi nding Elements
74. Personal Image
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Wayfi nding must occur at two separate levels—underground (within the metro transit 
system) and at street level.  Similar to the way in which public health information is 
distributed, a connection to a coordinated response network would be established and 
would control the information conveyed to the public based on the scale and location 
of an throughout an urban context.  The adaptation of existing information devices on 
both levels of an urban context would provide all potential scenarios and users with 
information that would direct them to care locations.  In addition to directing possible 
victims on foot, wayfi nding should be located so that those in vehicles can also obtain 
direction.
Information displayed to potential victims would identify the location of activated 
healthcare facilities or alternate care locations within proximity to the self-triage kiosk. 
Wayfi nding would provide a type of mapping, and visual queue for patients, establishing 
opportunities for them to be directed to care locations assigned by their self-triage 
diagnosis during an event during which they may be overwhelmed with unnerving 
emotions.  All wayfi nding components would not be utilized at once; patients shouldn’t 
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be directed to contexts (alternative or conventional healthcare settings) that are not 
activated.  Wayfi nding is established through a minimal architectural interjection capable 
of being used on a latent basis (to convey public health information, or information 
regarding events throughout the city).  Digital signage located above ground would 
have the ability to be powered by solar panels, similar to the way in which many street 
lamps function today.  This would therefore allow the continuous operation if the power 
grid was disrupted.
Wayfi nding located within the metro system would occur through the adaptation 
of information displayed on existing digital signage (Figure 67) located at the train 
platforms.  As previously noted, this signage would also be used to convey public 
health information.  The adaptation of existing signage would occur through the use 
of integrated technology with an established connection to the network.  The remote 
network of emergency responders would determine the need for metro (trains) to be 
used as a type of medical transport.  When not commandeered by response authorities 
specifi cally for medical transport, it can be assumed that less critical victims or those 
who can be served at an alternative care location would be appropriately directed to 
Figure 75, Digital Signage
75. Personal Image
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designated trains and buses to travel between their individual triage and the location 
where they will be treated depending on their need for isolation from the general public. 
Critical victims would presumably need medical assistance and may need to rely more 
heavily on emergency responders.  Those victims independently moving toward care 
locations would need signage on the street to direct them from the metro stop to the 
appropriate setting to receive care.
Wayfi nding that occurs at the street level would be critical during an event in which the 
underground metro system was the targeted site and potential victims could not rely on 
Metro trains for transportation.  When the metro system is unable to act as a component 
of the response network, the bus system would be utilized instead.  Wayfi nding is 
equally as important during this type of scenario due to the fact that more people will 





Through the utilization of the existing mass transportation network and it’s supporting 
elements, this proposal for a systemic and architectural response to bioterrorism in 
Washington, D.C. will focus primarily on the identifi cation and development of 
architectural and programmatic interventions including public health displays, 
independent triage terminals, and wayfi nding elements.  Dispersed throughout the mass 
transit system, these interventions are designed to supplement existing resources and 
to provide the walking well with services that they would typically seek at a traditional 
healthcare setting therefore reducing the potential for non-critical victims during an 
event to inundate typical care environments.
The transit network, specifi cally the metro rail system (Figure 76, Figure 77) in 
Washington D.C. is an icon and has established nodal conditions throughout the D.C. 
area.  As a result of the conditions for which they are designed, public mass transportation 
systems have the ability to handle the ebb and fl ow of large masses of people; these 
types of systems are also capable of managing changing passenger fl ow during peak 
hours.  Increased numbers and more frequent trains can accommodate a larger number 
of customers during rush hour, as well as the ability to change the fl ow of turnstiles 
Figure 76, Metro Iconographic Signage




to meet the demands of riders entering and exiting stations.  For example, during rush 
hour in order to meet the demands of the fl ow, stations at the end of a rail line convert 
the majority of their ticketing turnstiles to allow more riders to exit a station than enter; 
the opposite condition would occur at these stations in the morning rush hour.  During 
an event it is critical to be able to adapt a response context based on the demands of 
both predicted and unpredictable victim fl ow.
Distributing a response to meet the needs of the primary victim typology, the walking 
well, throughout an urban context alleviates the potential for these patients to seek 
unnecessary care at traditional healthcare settings.  The metro system has the ability 
to function independently as a type of response without immediate assistance from an 
emergency responder.  This component of the transit system however would need to be 
controlled from a hierarchical remote point of response at the communication center 
defi ned previously within this thesis.  Utilizing an existing system during a response to 
bioterrorism that is capable of handing large numbers of people on a daily basis allows 
the focus of the healthcare provider to center around critical and non-critical victims 
rather than having to focus on managing and fi ltering the needs of the walking well.
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Metro Station Typology: Metro stations located throughout D.C. commonly have two 
basic confi gurations that are defi ned by their entrance location—a corner condition or 
storefront condition of a building façade that is open at grade to the sidewalk (Figure 
78) or within an open plaza area (Figure 79).  Typically, when a building façade entry 
occurs, there is a limited covered space where response interventions and efforts can 
take place due the minimal sidewalk space.  Open plaza conditions are more spacious 
and allow for a more generous opportunity for response; however, there are not many 
of these entrances throughout the network.
The progression of a rider through a Metro station occurs at three basic levels—entry, 
ticketing and platform.  At each of these levels an architectural interjection is proposed 
as a model of response during a bioterrorist event.  As a victim progresses through the 
metro station during an event the programmatic response present, such as individual 
triage, is tailored to the symptoms related to the type of agent used during an attack.  This 
type of fi ltering should occur so that actual patients are directed to appropriate healthcare 
or alternative care location, and ultimately so that the walking well do not disrupt the 
Figure 78, Corner Condition Entry




ability of responders to provide care for those in need of medical treatment.
At the (street) entry level, this thesis proposes that public health display elements be 
integrated into the fabric of the metro station and serve both an everyday latent as well 
as an activated function during an event.  Also at the entry level, the initial point of 
independent triage would occur and include thermal scans.  It is necessary to provide 
both of these architectural and programmatic interjections at the entry level so that the 
walking well are given the opportunity to determine whether or not they have symptoms 
and need to seek further treatment to prevent them from inundating a metro station.
Ticketing areas typically include multiple independent ticketing machines (Figure 80), 
a station operator kiosk (with a metro employee present) and turnstiles that allow riders 
to progress to the platform levels. (Figure 81)  This thesis proposes that the second 
stage of independent triage, self-diagnosis takes place at this level through the adaptive 
reuse of ticketing terminals.  The number of ticketing points available within a Metro 
station depends on daily utilization as well as the number of rail lines that are present 
within a station.  This thesis assumes that the existing number of terminals will be 
Figure 80, Ticketing Terminals




adequate during a response effort.  Information technologies are already in place with 
existing metro stations; during an event a proposed response (such as self-triage) would 
piggy-back on to those components (by converting internal software systems).  In case 
of an event, the existing metro system components and functions (such as the ticketing 
terminals) would be overridden and controlled by the network control center.  Once a 
potential victim has completed the self-diagnosis process they would receive a ticket 
with their information and diagnosis.  The ticket would not only have a summary of 
their assessment but a specifi c treatment location would be identifi ed so that the victim 
would know where to seek further care.  The machines used for this process would be 
modifi ed versions of the ticketing machines currently used in the metro and would be 
able to issue regular metro tickets during normal conditions.  
Likewise the turnstiles (Figure 82) that allow entry into the metro system would also be 
replaced with adapted versions that serve both a daily function and a modifi ed function 
during a terrorist event.  Entry turnstiles are a controlled component and the number 
of them in any given station is based on the size of the station.  The direction in which 
people can use them varies pending on the time of day and the demands of the fl ow of 
Figure 82, Entry Turnstiles
82. Personal Image
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traffi c.  This thesis will assume that an adequate number of turnstiles needed to handle 
the volume of people are provided. Under event response conditions after a victim has 
been assessed at the modifi ed ticketing machines they would insert their ticket into the 
turnstile tickets to enter--only patients that need additional medical care would be able 
to enter into the metro system.  This process helps to prevent the walking well (who do 
not require further medical attention) from entering into the metro system.  Only those 
victims with an appropriate diagnosis could proceed into the metro and use the adapted 
system accordingly.
Once at the platform level, riders are directed to their trains through the use of digital 
signage. (Figure 83)  During a response effort, station signage would be converted 
to provide wayfi nding and public health information—for example it would inform 
identifi ed victims of the platform that they need to be at in order to travel to a particular 
healthcare facility or alternative care location.  This signage would specifi cally 
convey information about which healthcare facilities and alternate care locations are 
activated, where they are located and what trains would be servicing those locations. 
Correspondingly, once a victim has arrived at the (destination) station serving their 
Figure 83, Platform Signage
83. Personal Image
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respective healthcare facility or alternative care site, appropriate stations signs would 
also be activated to provide wayfi nding from the platform to their destination.  At the 
platform level thermal scans could be activated only during instances where patients 
exiting trains were believed to have been exposed to an agent; during all other cases 



























Figure 85, Concentrated Event Study Areas
85. Personal Image
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Scenario Proposals and Response
Two potential events located within the urban threat context of Washington D.C. are 
illustrated in an effort to demonstrate the capability of both the systemic and specifi c 
architectural features proposed in this thesis.  Two of the greatest potential events 
include chemical and biological attacks.  (Figure 84, and Figure 85) The events include: 
‘a chemical attack on the National Mall’ and ‘anthrax released at RFK.’  Each event 
varies in the type of incident, scenario, and context therefore evaluation a range of 
potential variables and their impact on a response.  Both types of events will involve 
a large number of victims, however the timelines differ.  A chemical event lasts for a 
matter of a few days whereas a biological event lasts for weeks.  The events chosen 
to evaluate illustrate the range of potential variables that an architectural and systemic 
response will have to help manage during and following an act of bioterrorism.  
Each event scenario attempts to illustrate the full capability of a response during 
both chemical and biological attacks.  The events studied are examples of worst case 
scenarios; therefore any response that is capable of meeting the needs of the chosen 
events is capable of responding to events of bioterrorism with lower impact.
Figure 84, Concentrated Event Study Areas 
within the Context of Washington, D.C.
84. Personal Image
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This thesis studied the overall metro area of Washington, D.C. however a systemic 
response was evaluated within a more specifi c study area located centrally around 
each event.  The study area was determined by identifying an adequate number of 
healthcare facilities, and alternative care locations needed to handle the load of patients 
predicted for each event.  The study area also took into consideration the distribution of 
the activated response elements located within and near the metro rail and emergency 
routes within the city.  The study area serves as a model of response that can also be 
applied to the entire urban threat context of Washington, D.C.
Event Scenario 1, A chemical attack on the National Mall: The fi rst event study, a 
chemical release on the National Mall, takes place in front of the National Gallery of 
Art (Figure 86) and evaluates an architectural and systemic response to the impact 
of a chemical event. (Figure 87) The National Mall consists of many museums and 
monuments that line along a wide-open space and a highly populated area with tourists, 
a potential target of a terrorist attack. (Figure 78, Figure 79) Located at the end of the 
axis of this open space is the Capitol Building, also known as Capitol Hill, a highly 
signifi cant building that houses many federal government functions as well as signifi cant 
Figure 86, Epicenter for Chemical Attack 












Figure 87, Concentrated Chemical Study Area and Surrounding Landmarks
87. Personal Image
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representatives of the United States Legislature.  The White House is also within close 
proximity to the National Mall.  The surrounding urban infrastructure of the National 
Mall is a considerably high threat area based on the premise that terrorists will target 
densely populated, high profi le areas within an urban context. A response effort that 
occurs on the National Mall is a unique but probable scenario based on the availability 
of large open spaces within an urban context.  
Although this attack takes place in an outdoor setting, a relatively small number of 
potential victims is exposed—150 people, of which 50 are diagnosed in critical condition. 
The response context is primarily located at the event epicenter with the assistance of 
existing resources—the National Metropolitan Response Team (NMRT).  This event 
spans a timeline of three days.  The epicenter serves as the response context where 
NMRT responds and provides decontamination.  Despite efforts make at the epicenter 
many potential victims move outside the containment area before it is established. 
Therefore activated responses including the display of public health information, and 
self-diagnosis to potential victims who have dispersed throughout the urban context are 
activated throughout the broader context of the metro system; the primary delivery of 
care however is decontamination at the epicenter.
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A response must provide the walking well with information about the event and the 
agent that has been released so that they can determine whether or not they have been 
exposed.  Systemically during this event the transit network is adapted and used to 
transport victims who have dispersed throughout the context so that they can return 
back to the epicenter where they will receive decontamination and further evaluation 
from medical responders.  The immediate recognition and awareness of a chemical 
agent conveyed in this event scenario allows for an immediate response strategy.
Sequence of Events during a Chemical Attack on the National Mall: At 9:10 in 
the morning tourists are beginning to arrive at museums along the National Mall. 
Federal employees are walking and driving near the Mall to get to their offi ces.  At 
a nearby metro station commuters are exiting onto the Mall.  The National Mall is 
moderately populated with a wide variety of people—all potential targets of terrorism. 
An indiscrete, empty bus is parked on a street lining the Mall. (Figure 80)  Without 
warning, a chemical bomb planted within the bus explodes spreading mustard gas 
throughout the immediate context.  One hundred and fi fty people within the epicenter 
163
are infected; fi fty of them are critically injured.  The chemical agent is immediately 
detected by a monitoring device located within close proximity to the epicenter (on the 
Mall.)  Emergency offi cials immediately confi rm the chemical agent, and emergency 
responders within close proximity are dispatched to the epicenter.  NMRT, located less 
than ten minutes away in Arlington, Virginia is sent to the site in order to provide mass 
decontamination.  George Washington University Hospital in  notifi ed of the attack and 
immediately begins to prepare for the infl ux of victims.
During the end of the fi rst day, during the timeline of the event, the majority of actual 
victims have been identifi ed and treated at the decontamination site administered by 
NMRT. (Figure 89)  In order to prevent the walking well from inundating NMRT at 
the epicenter, metro stations throughout DC remain activated to provide public health 
information.  Thermal scans within close proximity to the epicenter remain activated 
and on average an additional one-hundred fi fty potential victims are performing thermal 
scans per hour, although none show a positive result.  Metro lines remain closed allowing 
exposed, non-critical victims the opportunity to utilize the response network—including 
thermal scans, public health information and self-diagnosis if necessary.  The lines Figure 89, Chemical Attack, Epicenter, Location for NMRT to provide Decontamination
89. Personal Image
Figure 88, Empty Bus Houses the Chemical 
Bomb on the National Mall
88. Personal Image
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remain closed to the public to prevent additional people from entering the epicenter and 
overwhelming responding healthcare facilities.  The local bus system supplements the 
conventional metro system by providing additional buses along the same route that the 
metro would be operating, allowing commuters throughout the city to continue normal 
movement through and out of the city.  During rush hour, the bus lines remain active to 
provide transit along the full length of metro lines, allowing commuters who normally 
rely on the metro rail to leave the city.
The number of non-critical victims presenting themselves for decontamination is low, 
and almost non-existent.  At the end of the response effort, the network control center is 
no longer necessary to collaborate response efforts; it is deactivated.  All response sites 
and systems that had been activated throughout the metro stations are also deactivated. 
NMRT begins to breakdown their equipment and discontinue services, as all infected 
patients have been identifi ed and treated.  Post-event, the Environmental Protection 
Agency begins to clean-up the epicenter as well as evaluate and clean-up the area 
surrounding the epicenter.  Part of the clean-up process includes destroying activated 
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elements such as thermal scans.  Understanding that the majority of critical patients will 
be treated at the epicenter, it is still a viable assumption that thermal scans (for example) 
may be exposed to a chemical agent through contaminated victims.  Additionally, 
the proposed materials that are used to construct thermal scans may not be able to 
function as needed during future events after being decontaminated.  Therefore they are 
removed, and replaced post-event.  Ultimately, metro stations are reopened to riders, 
after sensors within the Metro and surrounding areas deem the air quality safe and non-
contaminated.
166
Figure 91, Victim FlowFigure 90, Victim Dispersion
90. Personal Image 91. Personal Image
Non-critical but exposed victims begin 
to disperse throughout the urban con-
text and away from the immediate 
epicenter. 
Emergency response arrives at the Na-
tional Mall and begins to treat critical 
victims at the epicenter.  Emergency 
responders transfer non-critical victims 
to a location downwind of the epicenter 
where treatment will occur.  
Post release of mustard gas, because of the fact that the agent is odorless, vic-
tims within proximity to the event who believe that they were far enough away 













Figure 92, Activated Metro Stations
92. Personal Image
9:15 a.m.
Communication Network activated at a 
hospital outside the range of impact 
Metro rail lines shut down to prevent rid-
ers from exiting and dispersing through-
out the urban context.  Trains along the 
red, orange and blue lines that recently 
passed through the Mall area L’Enfant 
station plus the Smithsonian Metro 
Station are evacuated so that potential 
victims can exit at the Metro Station and 
perform individual thermal scans; public 
health information is displayed at the 
platform level. 
Oncoming trains are stopped before 
reaching the Smithsonian Metro Station, 
as well as surrounding metro stations, 
preventing people from dispersing into 
the epicenter.
Metro Center,  Smithsonian, Federal Triangle, Archives/Navy Memorial and L’Enfant 
Plaza—metro stations with potentially infected patients that could have dispersed 
activate thermochromic surfaces and self-diagnosis stations as well as public health 
display elements that informs potential victims of their possible exposure.  
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Figure 93, Activated Thermal Scans
93. Personal Image
9:20 a.m.
Emergency response dispatched to assist 
within the metro system at stations where 
trains are evacuated.
Responders and metro employees within 
stations assist victims, and redirect the 
walking well; digit signage also conveys 
information as to how to exit the metro 
station. 
Riders including acutely exposed victims 
and the walking well, waiting on the 
platform at stations within proximity to 
the Mall are evacuated from the metro 
station; after all metro trains have been 
evacuated rail lines are closed and are 
dedicated only to be used for emergency 
response transportation. 
 Potentially infected riders waiting on the 
platform self-test themselves (to confi rm 
exposure) by interacting with thermal 
scans to determine whether or not in-
fected. 
The ticketing system is converted to 
allow patients who received a positive 
diagnosis from the thermal scans to 
perform a further, more in depth self-di-
agnosis.  
Thermal scans are activated at the platform level to provide an instant diagnosis for 
potentially infected victims forced to evacuate trains that would have been in proxim-
ity to the National Mall during the attack.  
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Figure 94, Activated Public Health Information
94. Personal Image
9:25 a.m. 
NMRT arrives at the epicenter to set up a 
mass decontamination unit.
9:30 a.m. 
Citical victims from the epicenter trans-
fered to George Washington University 
Hospital 
9:35 a.m. 
Media coverage begins in collaboration 
with the Communication Network be-
gins.
Throughout the city announcements and 
alerts are sent to advise the public of the 
situation. 
The communication network relays infor-
mation to the public, in particular where 
the walking well and non-critical victims 
can receive care.  
Displays at metro stations within close proximity to the epicenter as well as those 
dispersed throughout the city are activated to inform the public that an attack has 
taken placed and necessary precautions should be taken by the public domain as a 
whole.  
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Figure 95, Activated Thermal Scans at Street Level
95. Personal Image
9:45 a.m. 
Non-critical victims begin decontami-
nation administered by NMRT at the 
epicenter.
Evacuated victims at metro stations 
receive further diagnosis of exposure if 
thermal scan indicated exposure to agent.
Non-contaminated commuters, those 
who received negative results from the 
thermal scan are evacuated from station.
 
Thermal scans are activated at street level providing diagnosis for potential victims 










Figure 96, Infected Patients Transported
96. Personal Image
10:00 a.m.
Victims in need of further care and de-
contamination transported to decontami-
nation site near epicenter via the orange 
line of the Metro rail.
10:05 a.m. 
Entry to the metro reopened, although 
the red and blue lines remain closed to 
provide transportation to alternative care 
locations. 
Public health information displayed at 
Smithsonian Metro entrance.
Large amount of walking well present 
themselves due to their proximity to the 
epicenter.
10:30 a.m.
At epicenter all critical victims have 
been transported to a healthcare facility.  
Treatment at the epicenter is focused on 
the walking well and non-critical victims. 
Hazmat teams, as well as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) evaluate 
the extent of the release and the intensity 
of the clean-up. 
 
At the epicenter, decontamination is set up to provide care to non-critical, infected 
victims.  Victims are transferred from self-diagnosis sites located within the metro 
station via the metro line to the context in which care is being delivered by NMRT.      













Figure 97, Infected Patients Diagnosed
97. Personal Image
10:35 a.m. 
Hazmat teams, as well as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) evaluate 
the extent of the release and the intensity 
of the clean-up.
Areas upwind of epicenter are evaluated 
to further understand the breadth of area 
the agent traveled. (Figure 97)
Majority of known victims have been 
decontaminated.
Law enforcement assists the NMRT in 
crowd control.
11:00 a.m.
Remaining Metro Stations activated 
throughout the city. 
150+/- riders/pedestrians are receiving 
thermal scans an hour.
 
1-2 new victims are diagnosed and transported to the Smithsonian Metro Station 
where they are transported to George Washington Hospital.  The number of infected 
victims remains constant throughout the city over a 24 hour period.  The majority of 
victims however do not return a positive thermal scan.     












Figure 98, Alternative Transportation
98. Personal Image
11:00 a.m. (Cont’d)
Emergency vehicular routes throughout 
the city are not inundated with exiting  
employees/residents.
The communication network and media 
continue to provide coverage and alerts.   
The major form of communication is 
through the communication network 
(located in MD).
Non-critical patients have been decon-
taminated by NMRT.
Walking well - required to proceed 
through thermal scans, before decontami-
nation is administered; few patients need 
decontamination.
 
Metro lines remain closed; traditional riders forced to use other transportation systems 
supplemented by the metro bus system that creates new (temporary) lines along tradi-
tional metro routes.     
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Pneumatic Barriers
Figure 99, Pneumatic Barriers activated at Street Level
99. Personal Image
12:00 p.m.
Thermal scan use at the entry level in-
creases as the number of people/employ-
ees increases during the lunch hour.
Public health information intensifi es. 
No victims needing decontamination are 
detected within the system.
2:00 p.m.
Communication network staff and EPA 
decide to re-open Metro lines. 
Pneumatic barriers located at entry gates 
are removed, destroyed and replaced by  
trained metro engineers.
Entry to the Metro stations is reopened.
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Figure 100, Self Diagnosis Activated
100. Personal Image
3:00 p.m.
The majority of self-triage units convert-
ed back to latent function of ticketing.
Few remain open as self-diagnosis and 
public health information.
Thermal scans still deployed at entry 
level.
4:00 p.m.
Due to the impact on the Metro system, 
metro buses continue to run along the 
Metro line routes so that normal metro 
riders are transported out of city during 
rush hour. 
NMRT remains deployed on the mall 
throughout the night – several remaining 
infected patients receive decontamination
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EPA begins initial clean-up of the epicen-
ter, as well as local metro station.
The number of people continuing to pres-
ent as infected is low, and almost non-ex-
istent.   
1:00 p.m.
Communication center offi cials and the 
EPA decide that thermal scans can be 
deactivated. 
Thermal scans within the outer limits of 
the district are removed,  destroyed, and 
replaced by trained metro engineers.
6:00 p.m.
 Remaining thermal scans within close 
proximity to the epicenter are removed, 





NMRT breaks down decontamination 
site.
Epicenter clean up begins.  
Public health offi cials continues to pro-
vide information about the clean-up of 
the agent.
Clean-up and monitoring of the epicenter 
as well as localized Metro stations begins 
and continues for several days.
Riders are permitted within the Metro 
system; sensors within Metro deem air 
quality safe.
Trains used for transportation during 




Architectural Conclusion, A Chemical Attack on the National Mall: This chemical 
event scenario demonstrates the ability of an architectural and systemic response to 
activate immediately and serve a high number of potential victims within a concentrated 
area and brief amount of time.  During a chemical attack it is signifi cant to consider 
existing resources that may be able to handle the load of a mass decontamination 
facility.  In this instance, a mobile response team, the NMRT, was capable of providing 
this program response.  Part of the success in enabling their response is the fact that 
they, unlike many mobile response models are able to be self sustaining without having 
to ‘plug into’ external resources.  NMRT provides their own water and electrical 
resources.  The ability to set up and provide care regardless of sources such as water, 
and electricity make NMRT a more fl exible form of mobile response; however it can be 
assumed that most typologies of mobile response will need to be able to utilize existing 
sources of water and electricity. The location of this event enables the metro to play 
a signifi cant role during the response, in particular dealing with the task of informing 
the public.  It is reasonable to believe that the proposed systematic and architectural 
interventions were capable of responding to the immediate needs of a response during 
a mid-size chemical attack located within a densely populated, potential urban threat 
context.
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Event Scenario 2, Anthrax released at RFK: Event two, anthrax released at RFK, 
is not only located within the stadium, but also the residential context that surrounds 
it. (Figure 102, Figure 103) During the event populated by 50,000 attendees, a truck 
driving upwind of the stadium releases anthrax into the air infecting 10,000 fans and 
3,000 residents.  Post event, fans disperse throughout the metropolitan area unnoticed. 
Several days after the initial release, patients begin to show up at local emergency 
departments with symptoms similar to the fl u.  Five days after the initial release 
anthrax poisioning is recognized (in part due to the increasing number of patients with 
similar symptoms.)  This event spans for twelve days, a much longer period of time 
than the chemical event studied.  The primary architectural response during this event 
is self-diagnosis.  The primary treatment needed is immunization located at multiple 
sites within the alternative care network. This event involves prolonged times and the 
potentially high number of victims (including the walking well) who will need diagnosis 
and treatment.  A response must be capable of responding immediately, but it must also 
be capable of prolonging its activated function for a prolonger period of time.
Figure 102, Concentrated Biological Event Study 
Area within context of Washington D.C.
102. Personal Image
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During the remaining duration of response, the network control center, particularly 
the media component, continues to provide widespread coverage throughout the 
metropolitan area.  Public health information continues to be updated at activated 
public health terminals throughout the metro system.  Residents within close proximity 
to the stadium in particular are advised to seek further care, and are administered 
antibiotics.  Additional alternative care locations, such as the DC Armory adjacent 
to RFK, is activated.  The Armory is located within proximity to the metro transit 
system providing access for potential victims.  This facility would be activated as 
an alternative care locating providing minor care and (potential) vaccination to non-
critical victims.  The large size of this facility would be capable of compensating for 
the infl ux of patients within the metro area, including Maryland and Virginia (as well 
as the District of Columbia).
As the awareness of the event increases, the number of activated thermal scans and 
self-diagnosis terminals amplifi es within the metro system to provide care for the 
walking well.  Despite the increase in non-critical patients seeking care at alternative 
care locations, antibiotics are still available and continue to be distributed throughout 
the city.
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By the end of the seventh day of the response, patient fl ow decreases, and alternative care 
locations begin to deactivate.  Additionally thermal scans and self-diagnosis terminals 
no longer in demand by the walking well are deactivated so that their latent function 
can be restored.  Post-event decontamination of the self-triage kiosks and thermal scans 
must occur due to the large number of patient typologies that have come in contact with 
the proposed architectural interventions.  Additionally it can be assumed that during 
the post-event timeline the reinstallment of architectural interjections utilized during 
the response would occur so that the threat context is prepared for future response 
efforts.  For example self-diagnosis terminals would be decontaminated, and converted 
(internally) to their latent function of ticketing.  Thermal scans would be deactivated 
and reinstalled to their latent position in preparation for a future response effort.  Only 
a few larger alternative care locations, such as the DC Armory, Convention Center 
and Verizon Center Arena remain active. (Figure 111)  Both facilities are larger and 
capable of handling the remaining victim load.  Throughout the metro system, cleanup 
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) occurs; this is the same 
process that would occur after a chemical event.  This would involve the process of 
cleaning and decontaminating response locations to ensure that the agent has been 
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eradicated and is no longer a threat to the public.  It is important to perform a clean-up 
process so that the public is ensured of their safety.  Post clean-up metro stations would 
return to their daily, latent capabilities.    The overall cleanup and decontamination of 
the metro system and alternative care locations lasts for fi ve days, making the total 











Figure 103, Concentrated biological event study area
103. Personal Image
An event at RFK stadium becomes 
infected as a truck driving upwind of the 
stadium releases aerosolized anthrax into 
the environment.  
10,000 fans and 3,000 residents are ex-
posed to the agent.  
10:30 
Post game, fans disperse throughout the 
metropolitan area, including Washington, 
D.C., Virginia, and Maryland.  
Figure 104, Box Truck
104. Personal Image
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Figure 105, Biological Attack Epicenter and Surrounding Metro Area
105. Personal Image
Day 2
Biological agent unconfi rmed.  
People exposed at the game, or within 
proximity to RFK during the time of 
release move about the region without 
knowing that they have been exposed. 
public health information.
Thermal scans still deployed at entry 
level.
4:00 p.m.
Due to the impact on the Metro system, 
metro buses continue to run along the 
Metro line routes so that normal metro 
riders are transported out of city during 
rush hour. 
NMRT remains deployed on the mall 
throughout the night – several remaining 
infected patients receive decontamina-
tion.
Day 3, Morning
3,000 patients become symptomatic; 





Figure 106, Activated Care Locations
106. Personal Image
Day 3 (cont’d)
Increase in patient fl ow considered a 
possible increase in infl uenza exposure; 
anthrax not considered.  59 people die as 
a result of exposure to anthrax.  
Evening 
Anthrax confi rmed and linked to the 
deaths that took place throughout the day. 
 
6:00 p.m. 
The communication command center—
established outside of the urban threat 
context in Maryland, conveys public 
health information such as signs of expo-
sure, self-triage locations and activated 
alternative care locations, throughout the 
metro system, and through media re-
sources.  Care locations are activated. 
Thermal scans activated at Metro station 
entry points.Ticketing systems converted 
to provide further self diagnosis. Health-
care facilities are activated and begin 
treating critical patients; Alternative 
care locations begin to serve non-critical 
patients.   
 
185
Proposed Alternative Care Network
within Washington DC
Immediate Threat Context 
(RFK Stadium) Epicenter 
(RFK Stadium) Epicenter 
Activated Healthcare 
Facilities
Activated Alternative Care 
Locations (Schools)
Figure 107, Biological Event Epicenter
107. Personal Image
 7:00 p.m.
The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and HAZMAT teams investigate 
the exposure and remains of agent at the 
epicenter (RFK stadium).  Event at-
tendance studied by healthcare offi cials 
representated within the communication 
network to evaluate spread of disease.
The Centers for Disease Control [CDC] 
contacted; vaccines processed and re-
leased to Washington D.C. area hospitals 
and alternative care locations.
8:00 p.m.
The proposed alternate care network, 
such as schools, and larger convention 
centers and arenas, within Washington 
DC are staffed and begin to set up, in 
anticipation for the predicted patient fl ow 
beginning the next day. 
Day 4
Morning 
Alternate locations primarily schools 
within the immediate threat context  are 




Activated Bus Line Utilized to 
Transport Patients to 
Healthcare Facilities 
Activated (Red) Metro Line 
Utilized to Transport Patients 
to Healthcare Facilities and 
Alternative Care Locations 
Activated (Red Line) Metro Stations
Wayfinding Routes to Alternative
Care Locations 
Activated Alternative Care 
Activated Vehicular Routes 
Activated (Orange) Metro Line 
Activated (Orange Line) Metro Stations
Washington Hospital Center
Howard University Hospital
Figure 108, Alternative Transportation
108. Personal Image
5:00 p.m.
The network of alternative care locations 
throughout the urban context remain the 
primary points of care served by public 
health offi cials, and clinical staff.  How-
ever, medical staff remains primarily at  
activated hospitals to provide care for 
critical patients. 
Metro trains run on limited tracks (Red 
and Orange Lines) that have been con-
verted to provide transportation of 
infected patients to healthcare facilities, 
and well as less critical patients to alter-
native care locations.      
Bus Routes are converted to transport 
patients to healthcare facilities from ac-
tivated metro stations (on the orange and 
red line). 
Wayfi nding routes-both vehicular and 
walking are activated from metro stations 
to the activated alternative care locations. 
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Activated Bus Line 
Activated (Red) Metro Line 
Activated (Red and Orange 
Line) Metro Stations
(critical and non-critical patients)
Wayfinding Routes to Alternative
Care Locations 
Activated Alternative Care 
(non critical patients)
Activated Vehicular Routes 











Metro trains run on limited tracks, as 
some metro rail lines are converted to 
provide transportation of infected pa-
tients to healthcare facilities (Washington 
Hospital Center and Howard University 
Hospital), and well as less critical pa-
tients to alternative care locations.      













Figure 110, Patient Population & Dispersion
Day 5-6 Continues
Morning Cont’d
1,300 Patients confi rmed ill, treated at 
hospitals throughout urban context. 
2,000 walking well utilize thermal scans 
(Figure 98) throughout the morning rush 
hour at metro stations.  1,500 produce 
negative results and progress to self-di-
agnosis stations to further assess their 
state of health.  The majority of these 
patients are confi rmed to need further 
treatment or immunization and present 
themselves at alternate care locations. 
110. Personal Image
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Architectural Conclusion: Anthrax Released at RFK:
This biological event scenario demonstrates the scope and nature of a response on a 
widely dispersed level throughout the entire urban context and how  it might serve a 
potentially high number of walking well over a prolonged amount of time.  During 
a biological attack it is signifi cant to consider existing resources and alternative care 
locations that would be able to handle the load of the walking well and non-critical 
patients.
The length of time between the release of a biological agent and recognition can be a 
matter of days, unlike the immediate awareness of a chemical response.  Between the 
initial release and recognition, victims have dispersed and cannot be as easily contained 
and treated.  Providing public health information, and opportunities for self diagnosis, 
including thermal scans and self-diagnosis terminals at a dispersed level throughout 
an urban context provides the opportunity for potential victims and the walking well 
who have dispersed from the initial epicenter to determine whether or not they have 
been exposed.  Healthcare facilities are able to handle the load of victims who are 
critically ill because their numbers are signifi cantly less than non-critical patients.  A 
greater number of walking well will inherently be generated because of the delay in 
recognition, and therefore a response will rely heavily on establishing alternative care 
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locations for this patient typology.
Architectural Conclusion for Overall Scenario Proposals and Response:  Two 
potential events located within the urban threat context of Washington D.C. were 
illustrated in an effort to demonstrate the capability of both the systemic and specifi c 
architectural features proposed in this thesis.  Although each event varied in the type 
of incident, scenario, and context the intent of this evaluation was to study a differing 
potential variables and their impact on a response.  Each type of event involved a 
respectively signifi cant number of victims; however the timelines differed greatly—
from an immediate, short response to a delayed, prolonged response.
Each event scenario illustrates the potential capability of a response during both 
chemical and biological attacks.  The events studied were examples of typical event 
scenarios; therefore any response capable of meeting the needs of these hypothestical 




Figure 111, Remaining Active Care Locations
111. Personal Image
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This thesis studied the ability to utilize existing resources throughout the area of 
Washington, D.C. including the metro transit system and existing infrastructure.  Given 
that an act of bioterrorism is a low probability, high consequence event, a response 
must utilize existing multi-purpose resources in order to be cost effective and effi cient. 
Similarly, a response must be dispersed to meet the unpredictable demands and location 
of an event epicenter within potential urban threat contexts.  These events demonstrated 
that responses must be fl exible to meet the demands of patient fl ow during an event. 
Existing healthcare facilities have the ability to handle the predicted number of critical 
victims in particular since these victims will be in the minority during a response effort. 
The most signifi cant need identifi ed throughout this exercise is the ability to serve 
the walking well at a distributed level throughout a context so that they are directed 
appropriately away from traditional healthcare facilities.
Further studies regarding an act of bioterrorism may explore the ability of a response 
effort to react to multiple events within a single urban context.  If more than one event 
were to occur at once, how would a response effort react, and would there be suffi cient 
resources to handle this type of threat? Another event study may examine the possibility 
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of an urban threat context being evacuated.  This type of event would examine the 
capability of the proposed architectural interjections to respond appropriately—if 
potential patients are forced to evacuate the threat context, how do dispersed elements, 
such as thermal scans, and self-diagnosis terminals provide an appropriate response? 
It can be assumed however that this type of event would demonstrate the need for a 
response to occur at a distributed level outside of the defi ned urban threat context.
This thesis has focused on a signifi cant, and traditionally unaddressed population 
that has the ability to present themselves in great numbers—the walking well.  This 
population has the ability to cripple existing healthcare facilities that would otherwise 
be capable of handling most event scenarios.   Any response to an act of bioterrorism 
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